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Understanding the Determinants of Corporate Social Disclosure Strategies: An 
Examination of Firms’ Use of GRI Guidelines 
by 
James Michael Simmons Jr. 
 
 
 With the evolution of CSR reporting practices and the introduction and 
widespread adoption of the GRI Guidelines, this research sought to understand the factors 
that determine a company’s CSR disclosure strategy.  It examined the relationship 
between a four-dimensional model of reporting determinants and a firm’s CSR disclosure 
strategy.  The proposed model drew from legitimacy, institutional and stakeholder 
theories and included the following constructs: non-financial corporate characteristics, 
the firm’s financial performance, the involvement of the firm’s stakeholders and 
environmental turbulence.  The firm’s CSR disclosure strategy was represented by the 
GRI application level chosen by the firm and the presence or absence of third party 
assurance.  The study found environmental turbulence to be the only strongly predictive 
construct.  However, this construct and other predictive variables that were shown to be 
related help strengthen understanding of disclosure strategy.  Given these findings, four 
key concepts emerge that firms must consider in developing their CSR disclosure 
strategy.  These include stakeholder salience, environmental turbulence, mimetic 
behavior, and institutional norms.  
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 An increasing number of companies are voluntarily disclosing their social, 
environmental and economic impact (Chen and Bouvain, 2009).  With corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting, companies can demonstrate their attempts to meet 
society’s expectations (Gray, Owen & Maunders, 1988; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell, 1998; 
Yongvanich & Guthrie, 2006).  They are also able to show stakeholders that their firms 
are committed to social responsibility (Gamerschlag, Moller & Verbeeten, 2011; 
Hubbard, 2011; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).   
 CSR disclosures provide the firm with a powerful marketing tool that can be used 
to engage with stakeholders and enhance both the firm’s reputation and its brand  
(Bebbington, Larrinaga-Gonzalez & Moneva-Abadıa, 2008; Luo & Bhattacharya 2006; 
Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011; Sweeney & Coughlan, 2008).  The issue firms face, however, 
is that stakeholders are often unaware of the CSR initiatives companies undertake (Sen, 
Bhattacharya & Korschun, 2006).  When CSR initiatives are reported, they have been 
shown to have a favorable effect on how stakeholders think, feel and act toward a 
company and its brand (Hoeffler & Keller, 2002; Sen et al., 2006).  Consumer awareness 
of a company’s approach to CSR not only helps the firm be viewed as socially 
responsible, it also makes consumers more likely to purchase from the company (Sen et 




 CSR reporting can also help the firm shape its reputation in the market place (Sen 
et al., 2006).  It can provide an opportunity for companies to engage stakeholders in an 
ongoing dialogue (GRI, 2012; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  By sharing the firm’s CSR 
initiatives and disclosing its social, environmental and economic impact, marketers are 
able to engage with multiple stakeholder groups, build lasting relationships and thus 
create value for the firm (Bhattacharya & Korschun 2008; Ferrell, Gonzalez-Padron, 
Hult, & Maignan. 2010; Hult, Mena, Ferrell & Ferrell 2011).  
While CSR reporting is relevant to marketers and has gained popularity within the 
business community, scholars have shown far less interest in the topic (Chen & Bouvain, 
2009; Ziek, 2009).  In an order to gain a clear understanding of CSR disclosure/reporting, 
ABI/Inform was used to examine the literature associated with a robust list of key terms 
(Cronin et al., 2011).  This review of the literature showed that CSR disclosure research 
started later and increased at a slower pace than that which focused on CSR performance.  
Additionally, this research has been carried out primarily by non-marketing scholars and 
limited to a narrow range of topics (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011; Reverte, 2009).  For 
example, descriptive research was initially conducted in order to understand corporate 
reporting practices (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers, 1995; Wiseman, 1982).  The findings from 
that research led scholars to examine the relationship between a firm’s social and 
financial performance and its CSR disclosures (Ingram & Frazier, 1980; Reverte, 2009; 
Roman, Hayibor & Able; 1999).  Ultimately, CSR disclosure research focused on 
identifying the determinants of CSR reporting (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Cormier & 
Magnan, 1999; Roberts, 1992; Reverte, 2009).  Generally, research has produced 
inconsistent results across studies or results with limited generalizability (Adams & 
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Whelan, 2009; Parker, 2005).  However, two competing theoretical models emerged from 
the literature to help explain the determinants of CSR reporting (Ullmann, 1985; Adams, 
2002). 
 The first model that was proposed by Ullmann (1985) relied on stakeholder theory 
to help explain the relationship between a firm’s social and financial performance and the 
quantity and quality of its social disclosure.  Determinants were clustered into one of 
three factors that included the firm’s strategic posture, its financial performance and 
stakeholder power.  This model not only suggested a potential explanation for the 
relationship between performance and disclosure, it also encouraged further research into 
other possible determinants (Ullmann 1985).   
 The second model, proposed by Adams (2002), focused on different types of 
contextual factors that included corporate characteristics, general contextual factors and 
internal factors.  Corporate characteristics included variables such as size and industry 
membership.  General factors included variables that reflect the influence of culture, 
media, government and other stakeholders.  Internal factors focused on the firm’s 
structure and decision-making processes (Adams, 2002).  
 While these models have been useful, both the environment in which disclosures 
are made and the process for reporting has changed dramatically since they were 
introduced.  In more recent research, scholars have also pointed out potential issues with 
the theoretical framework and the methods that have been used.  When taken together, 
these factors raise questions about whether the models proposed by Ullmann (1985) and 
Adams (2002) are sufficient to explain the determinants of CSR reporting.   
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Additional empirical research is clearly needed to help provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the factors that influence a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  
 As noted previously, companies face a significantly different business 
environment than when Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002) first proposed their models.  
Economic slowing, political discontent and technological advancements have combined 
to make the business environment more difficult to navigate (Berthon, Pitt, Plangger & 
Shapiro, 2012; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Mason, 2006).  Since 2008, the United States and 
many countries in Europe have experienced a significant economic downturn.  Increased 
unemployment, growing government debt and slowing economies have created economic 
and political challenges for both government and business (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 
2010).  Technological advancements and increasing use of social media have also helped 
make corporate activities visible to a broader audience that ever before (Berthon et al., 
2012; Du, Bhattacharya & Sen, 2010).  
 With information so readily available, demands for accountability have increased 
(Islam & Deegan, 2010; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  An increasing 
number of companies are disclosing their CSR activities in order to meet society’s 
expectations.  From 2005 to 2008, the percentage of public companies that reported their 
CSR initiatives grew from 50% to 80% (KPMG, 2008).  By 2011, that percentage had 
grown to 95% (KPMG; 2011: Berthon et al., 2012; Hubbard, 2011; KPMG, 2011; Kolk 
& Pinkse, 2010; Mason, 2006).  
 The observed growth in CSR disclosures has been accompanied by the 
introduction and widespread adoption of reporting standards like the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) Guidelines (Hubbard, 2011; KPMG, 2011).  These Guidelines were first 
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introduced in 1999 and have been revised three times with the current version, the GRI’s 
G3 Guidelines, released in 2006.  The G3 Guidelines provide companies with a way to 
communicate to stakeholders that certain requirements have been met (Gamerschlag et 
al., 2011; GRI, 2012; Moneva, Archel & Correa, 2006).   
 Before these standards were developed, there was a lack of uniformity and 
disclosures often failed to report information that stakeholders found useful.  The 
developers of the GRI sought to change this by introducing standards that would help 
guide firms in knowing what to report.  The guidelines’ creators also sought to make 
reporting easier to review and compare (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011; Willis 2003).  To 
achieve this, they relied on broad stakeholder input to develop key performance 
indicators.  These indicators focus on economic, environmental and social factors, which 
are commonly referred to as the Triple-Bottom Line (Elkington, 1994, 1998; GRI, 2012; 
Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).   
 The GRI performance indicators provide more extensive coverage than any of the 
other reporting standards (Perrini, 2005).  The framework includes 50 core performance 
indicators that describe the firm’s economic, environmental and social impact and 28 
additional indicators that focus on areas like human rights, labor economic development, 
community, investment, product responsibility, air and water quality, energy, waste and 
corruption (Hubbard, 2011; Perrini 2005).  Given their breadth, the guidelines not only 
help improve the usefulness of reporting, they also provide greater transparency about the 
firm’s operation.  They help assure stakeholders that both the firm and its disclosures can 
be viewed as legitimate (Arviddson, 2010; GRI, 2012).  As a result, the GRI Guidelines 
have become the most widely adopted reporting standard by firms globally with 
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approximately 80% of the Global 250 currently using them (Chen & Bouvain, 2009; 
KPMG, 2011; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011; Waddock & Googins, 2011).  They have also 
been endorsed by a broad range of stakeholders such as the World Economic Forum, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union (Ho 
& Taylor, 2007). 
 While GRI provides guidance, firms must still make several strategic decisions in 
determining their CSR disclosure strategy.  First, they must determine how transparent 
they wish to be in their reporting (GRI, 2012).  The G3 Guidelines include three 
application levels – A, B and C - that communicate to stakeholders that a certain level of 
reporting has been undertaken.  These application levels are self-declared and differ in 
their reporting requirements.  For instance, organizations that declare a C application 
level report on a minimum of 10 core performance indicators including at least one from 
each category: social, economic and environment.  Those who declare a B application 
level must report a minimum of 20 core performance indicators and must report on at 
least one from the economic, environment, labor practices & decent work, human rights, 
society, product responsibility categories.  Those declaring an A application level must 
report on all 50 core performance indicators.   
 In addition to choosing an application level, the firm must also determine whether 
or not to pursue third party assurance (GRI, 2012; Moneva et al., 2006).  The process 
helps verify that both the report and the method used to create it are well documented, 
evidence-based, balanced and consistent with the GRI Reporting Framework (GRI, 2012; 
O’Dwyer, 2001).  It also helps reinforce the credibility and the legitimacy of both the 
firm and its reporting (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang & Yang, 2012).  Those firms that 
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utilize third party assurance may add a plus sign to their application level to acknowledge 
having gone through the process.  The combination of the firm’s chosen GRI application 
level and its level of assurance signal the firm’s legitimacy to stakeholders, which is 
consistent with both stakeholder and legitimacy theories. 
 Besides the issues noted thus far, scholars have also suggested several items that 
should be examined.  First, a larger number of stakeholders are known to influence 
society’s expectations and encourage greater corporate accountability (Fiss & Zajac, 
2006; Islam & Deegan, 2010; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  This would suggest that there 
is value in examining multiple stakeholders.  Ullmann (1985) focused on the shareholder 
while Adams (2002) referenced a broader set of stakeholders.  These included 
shareholders, employees, media and non-governmental organizations.  This broader 
perspective is evident in studies by Chen and Bouvain (2009), Belal and Roberts (2010), 
Shinkle and Spencer (2012) and Adams and Whelan (2009).  Other studies have shown 
that government and academia have begun to play a more significant institutional role 
(Adams & Whelan, 2009; Cormier, Gordon & Magnan, 2004).  Given the literature, a 
multi-stakeholder perspective is required. 
 Second, past research has suggested the need for a broader theoretical framework 
to explain CSR reporting strategies.  While legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and 
institutional theory have all been mentioned frequently in the literature (Gray et al., 1995; 
Milne & Patten, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2003; Oliver, 1991), no singular theory has been used 
effectively to explain the determinants of CSR disclosure (Cormier et al., 2005).  Several 
scholars, however, have suggested that stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory can 
work together to provide a more comprehensive explanation of a firm’s CSR disclosure 
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strategy (Adams & Whelan, 2009; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Gray et al., 1995).  Others 
have suggested that legitimacy theory must be used with stakeholder and institutional 
theories to provide a comprehensive explanation (Adams & Whelan, 2009; Deegan & 
Blomquist, 2006; Gray et al., 1995).   
 Finally, researchers have used content analysis to evaluate the quantity and 
quality of CSR disclosure, but it has some noteworthy limitations (Deegan & Gordon, 
1996; Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie et al., 2004; Guthrie & Farneti, 2008; Guthrie & Parker, 
1989).  This method allows researchers to quantify the amount of key information 
included in CSR disclosures (Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Guthrie et al., 2004).  However, 
the reliability of the analysis is dependent on the ability of raters to consistently apply a 
set of rules (Ingram & Frazier, 1980).  The number of firms that may be examined may 
also be limited because of the amount of time it takes to carry out the analysis 
(Gamerschlag et al., 2011). 
 When Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002) first introduced their models, they may 
have been sufficient to explain the determinants of CSR disclosure strategy.  However, 
multiple factors have been discussed that would suggest this may no longer be true.  As 
noted here, scholars have pointed out potential issues with the theoretical framework and 
methods that have been used in past CSR disclosure research.  When combined with the 
introduction of reporting standards and a turbulent business environment, it is clear that 
additional empirical research is needed.  The purpose of this study is to address the issues 
that have been raised here and help provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
factors that influence a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy. 
 Unlike other studies, this research will rely on a broad theoretical framework that 
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includes stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and institutional theory.  When used 
together, these theories have a complementary effect.  This is exemplified in a new 
conceptual model that can be used to explain the determinants of CSR disclosure.  The 
four-dimensional model, shown in Figure 1 builds upon previous research by Ullmann 
(1985) and Adams (2002).  This model adapts the dimensions from the original models 
based on research findings and environmental changes that have taken place since their 
introduction.  In doing so, it highlights the role that both the stakeholder and the 
institutional environment have in shaping the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  This 
represents a broader role for both the stakeholder and for economic and political factors 
that result in environmental turbulence.  The model includes 4 constructs –non-financial 
corporate characteristics, the firm’s financial performance, the involvement of the firm’s 
stakeholders and environmental turbulence.  
 This research also adds to our knowledge of CSR reporting in several additional 
ways.  First, it redefines the concept of CSR disclosure strategy to include the choices 
firms face given the growing use of the GRI guidelines.  In doing so, it examines the 
firm’s chosen GRI application level and its level of assurance as unique dependent 
variables.  Second, rather than relying on the commonly used method of content analysis; 
this research utilizes a registry of global publicly traded firms that have reported using the 
G3 Guidelines.  Third, it increases the awareness of CSR reporting amongst marketers.  
This is critical because marketers are charged with responsibility for monitoring the 
external environments, managing the firm’s reputation, protecting critical brand assets 
and engaging with stakeholders who are critical to the firm (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  
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Figure 1  Conceptual Model 
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While marketing scholars have examined the theoretical and managerial implications of 
CSR, the role of CSR disclosures is a new area worthy of exploration (Nikolaeva & 
Bicho, 2011).  
 The literature review that follows provides a clear picture of prior research and 
uses theory to help put past results into context.  It also illuminates gaps in knowledge 
and shows areas related to CSR disclosure strategies that require further study.  Finally, it 
helps demonstrate the theoretical rationale for the model and its related constructs that are 
proposed here.  Ultimately, the literature review provides a strong foundation for this 











 Researchers have used a broad theoretical framework to explain CSR reporting 
strategies.  While legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory have all 
been mentioned frequently in the literature (Gray et al., 1995; Milne & Patten, 2002; 
O’Dwyer, 2003; Oliver, 1991), no one theory, when used alone, effectively explains a 
firm’s CSR disclosure strategy (Cormier et al., 2005).  Several scholars, however, have 
suggested that stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory can work in tandem to provide a 
more comprehensive explanation (Adams & Whelan, 2009; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; 
Gray et al., 1995).   
 Others have suggested that institutional theory can also be useful in explaining the 
adoption and use of frameworks for reporting CSR initiatives (Chen & Bouvain, 2009; 
Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011) since the theory focuses on the way in which choices are 
shaped, mediated and channeled by an organization’s rules, norms and beliefs (Hoffman, 
1999).  CSR reporting and other actions of the firm are guided by a common institutional 
understanding that drives strategic choices.  Like stakeholder and legitimacy theories, 
institutional theory can be used to describe corporate strategies and practices across a 
series of industries and countries.  As a result, all three theories will be drawn upon to aid 
in explaining the determinants of CSR disclosure strategy.  The following sections 
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highlight the gaps in each theory when used singularly to explain CSR disclosure 
strategies. They also show the synergy that is created when multiple theories are used 
together.   
Legitimacy Theory 
 Legitimacy theory asserts that a social contract exists between business and 
society that forces a firm to behave in a socially desirable manner (Gray et al., 1988).  By 
operating within society’s norms and expectations, the firm receives either passive or 
active support for its operations (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; O’Dwyer, 2003; Suchman, 
1995).  However, those norms and expectations may change over time and create 
incongruity between a firm’s values and those of society.  For the firm to maintain 
legitimacy, it must be cognizant of changes to the environment and be ready to engage in 
a legitimization process (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Islam & Deegan, 2010).   
In order to maintain organizational legitimacy with society, an organization must 
engage in communication with its various stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996; Suchman, 
1995).  CSR reporting is an important example of this type of communication 
(Arvidsson, 2010; Deegan, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002).  Ultimately, disclosing CSR-related 
activities and engaging in the assurance process serves to signal legitimacy and helps a 
company manage its corporate reputation (Bebbington, Larrinaga-Gonzalez & Moneva-
Abadıa, 2008; Fombrun & Gardberg, 2000; Gray et al., 1995). 
The voluntary disclosure of a firm’s CSR activities to both internal and external 
stakeholders can generate dialogue and result in acknowledgement and/or approval of the 
organization’s objectives and strategies.  Voluntary CSR reporting can help repair, attain 
or maintain both organizational and system wide legitimacy (Ader, 1995; Neu, Warsame 
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& Pedwell, 1998).  As a result of such disclosures, a firm is perceived as socially 
responsible (Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999).  Large companies are typically more 
visible as a result of their size and impact, which leads to increased public attention and 
concerns about the firm’s legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975).  These concerns often 
lead society to have increased expectations of responsible behavior and expectations that 
the firm disclose CSR activities also tend to increase (Arvidsson, 2010).  Yet, the 
disclosure of too much CSR information, commonly referred to as the “self-promoters 
paradox,” can harm an organization’s credibility (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Morsing & 
Schultz, 2006). 
In one study that used legitimacy theory as its underlying framework, O’Dwyer 
(2002) examined the motives for CSR reporting among 29 senior executives in Irish 
companies.  The perspectives of these senior executives suggested that companies, 
particularly those in environmentally sensitive sectors, initially engaged in some form of 
CSR as a form of reaction to localized external pressures that threatened the firm’s 
legitimacy.  While the actions of the executives and their firms were motivated initially 
by legitimacy concerns, disclosure reporting was ultimately deemed unlikely to lead to 
the successful attainment of a legitimacy state.  Hence, many of the reporting companies 
in the study neglected to engage consistently in CSR disclosure due to a perceived 
negative and suspicious reaction among various report stakeholders.  
Legitimacy theory alone cannot explain the motives for reporting.  While the 
theory describes the pursuit of legitimacy as the major aim of CSR reporting, it fails to 
fully explain the role of stakeholders or to distinguish the stakeholders, which may have 
more influence.  The theory also does not explain the role that institutional norms, values 
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and beliefs may have (Hoffman, 1999; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Nikolaeva & 
Bicho, 2011).  As a result, legitimacy theory must be used with stakeholder and 
institutional theories to provide a comprehensive explanation (Adams & Whelan, 2009; 
Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Gray et al., 1995).   
Stakeholder Theory 
 Stakeholder theory not only influences a firm’s approach to social responsibility, 
it also guides the way a firm reports its activities (Gray et al., 1995).  The theory’s 
influence is evident in the way its foundational pillars can be extended to CSR reporting.  
In the course of operating, firms interact with multiple stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Hult et al., 2011).  This stakeholder interaction 
creates greater risk for the firm, which requires managers to be more comprehensive in 
reporting.  The content of the reports then reflects the stakeholder’s influence on the 
firm’s strategy and its allocation of resources (Jones, 1995; Hill & Jones, 1992).  Because 
there is often incongruity among stakeholders, the firm focuses on those who are believed 
to have the greatest salience (Freeman, 1984; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Hult et 
al., 2011; Jones, 1995; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997).  
   Stakeholder salience is determined by the attributes of stakeholder power to 
influence the firm, the legitimacy of the stakeholder relationship with the firm and the 
urgency of the stakeholder’s claim.  Managers use some combination of these attributes 
to prioritize stakeholders of interest.  Disclosure reporting efforts often focus on the 
expectations of stakeholders, with the disclosure report serving as the avenue for a formal 
dialogue between the stakeholder and the firm.  Reporting efforts are often made more 
complicated because of the dynamic and subjective nature of these attributes (Milne & 
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Patten, 2002).  Ultimately, stakeholder theory can be useful in guiding a firm’s CSR 
reporting efforts as managers seek to meet the expectations of a variety of stakeholders 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997). 
   While stakeholder theory helps identify and prioritize stakeholders for CSR 
reporting, it does not provide a robust explanation as to why CSR reporting is necessary.   
The theory focuses on the expectations of stakeholders as the primary motivation for 
reporting.  It could be argued that these expectations are synonymous with legitimacy 
theory.  However, these are the expectations of only a select group of stakeholders who 
are selected based on their influence, legitimacy and the urgency of their claim.  
Legitimacy, on the other hand, involves a broader group and relies on society’s norms, 
values and beliefs (Hoffman, 1999; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 
2011).  Therefore, stakeholder theory cannot be used alone to explain the determinants of 
CSR disclosure strategy.   
Institutional Theory 
 Institutional theory suggests that firms operate in environments that are shaped by 
a system of norms, values and beliefs (Hoffman, 1999; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; 
Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  This context may also be influenced by disruptive events like 
economic or political turbulence (Hoffman, 1999).  For companies who seek legitimacy, 
these factors can create institutional pressure to adapt policies and practices.  As a result, 
companies often exhibit mimetic behaviors (Milne & Patten, 2002).  They are also more 
likely to justify their decisions based on the actions other companies have taken 
(Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  
 Prior research has examined the effect of institutional factors on the CSR 
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practices of companies across industries and countries.  An analysis of firms in Western 
Europe showed national institutions to be a strong predictor of firm level CSR practices.   
Industrial sectors were also shown to be a strong predictor.  These findings support the 
idea that CSR practices are more likely to be adopted when they are recognized as 
institutionalized norms (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010).   
 Empirical evidence has also suggested that the institutional environment plays a 
pivotal role in influencing companies reporting practices.  CSR disclosures provide an 
important vehicle for companies to communicate legitimacy.  The disclosures also 
provide a means by which to signal to stakeholders that the companies have sound CSR 
activities.  As a result, CSR reporting is a valuable tool to express concern for society and 
demonstrate legitimacy (Othman, Darus & Arshad, 2011).   
 Not only have institutional pressures been shown to be strong determinants of 
CSR disclosures, they have also been able to play a role in firms’ adoption of the GRI 
standards.  Research has shown that firms that are more attuned to the environment are 
more sensitive to institutional pressures and are more likely to respond through increased 
disclosure.  Firms that are aware of institutional influences are also better able to 
strategically manage the resulting opportunities and threats (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).   
 While institutional theory can contribute to our understanding of CSR reporting, it 
is insufficient when used by itself to explain disclosure practices.  Because the theory 
primarily relies on institutional pressure to explain the actions of companies, it 
underestimates the influence of stakeholders and the need to pursue legitimacy.  
Therefore, institutional theory must be used with both stakeholder and legitimacy theories 
to more fully explain CSR disclosure.   
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CSR Reporting: A Changing Landscape 
Corporate scandals and the global economic downturn have forced companies to 
be more socially responsible.  They must meet their economic, legal, ethical and 
philanthropic obligations and be attentive to a broad group of stakeholders (Arvidsson, 
2010; Carroll, 1999; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Kennedy & 
Neuger, 2012).  However, it is not enough for corporations to merely engage in socially 
responsible activities, companies must also make their activities known.  With increasing 
demands for transparency, companies feel compelled to demonstrate social responsibility 
and report the impact of their social, economic and environmental activities to both 
internal and external stakeholders (Arvidsson, 2010; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Maignan et al., 1999).   
The firm’s social, economic and environmental impact is considered significant.  
However, as Kolk and Pinkse (p. 12) suggest, “materiality [significance] does not 
guarantee adequate disclosure.”  That is, consistent with legitimacy theory, firms must 
provide sufficient CSR disclosure1 to demonstrate that they are making an honest effort 
to meet society’s expectations (Neu et al., 1998; Yongvanich & Guthrie, 2006).  
Voluntary CSR reporting can help repair, attain or maintain organizational legitimacy 
(Ader, 1995).   
Voluntary CSR reporting provides companies with an opportunity to demonstrate 
transparency and accountability to society.  This can help provide stakeholders with 
insights about a company’s activities (Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Dando & Swift, 2003; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1	  The	  terms	  CSR	  disclosure	  and	  CSR	  reporting	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  both	  
terms	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  current	  document.	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Dubbink, Graafland & van Liedekerke, 2008; Reynolds & Yuthas, 2007; Shinkle & 
Spencer, 2012).  Some companies rely on the firm’s traditional annual report to disclose 
CSR efforts while other companies have chosen to use stand-alone reports (Chatterji & 
Levine, 2006; Haddock-Fraser & Fraser, 2008; Hooghiemstra, 2000).  The volume and 
type of information that is reported vary across companies and some studies suggest that 
there are country and industry differences in the reports (Chen & Bouvain, 2009).   
Corporate social disclosures have evolved over time with society’s expectations.  
Prior to and during the 1970s, corporate reporting was used to help establish, support or 
restore perceptions of legitimacy (Deegan, 2002).  These disclosures were oriented 
toward describing either the effectiveness or the efficiency of CSR initiatives and were 
aimed largely at influencing public relations (Herzig & Schaltegger, 2006).  Beginning in 
the 1980s, society became more interested in the role of companies in environmental 
issues and public corporations began to focus on risk management and reputation 
enhancement (Bebbington et al., 2008).  For example, the number of environmental 
reports grew as the focus on ecological effectiveness increased.  From the mid-1990s to 
the end of the decade, the emphasis shifted to sustainability reports that included 
environmental, social and economic perspectives.  These reports adopted more of a 
global context and each of the CSR-related issues was dealt with in a more 
comprehensive manner (Herzig & Schaltegger, 2006).   
CSR Disclosure Research 
 While firms have engaged in CSR disclosure since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, there appears to have been minimal research interest in the topic (Hogner, 1982; 
Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell, 1998).  According to Adams (2002), 
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researchers were hesitant to invest time and effort in an area perceived to be difficult to 
measure or which had limited perceived usefulness and/or relevance to stakeholders.  A 
review of the literature suggests that scholars have engaged actively in attempting to 
assess CSR performance (which is measurable) but that the actual disclosure of the 
activities leading to performance was lacking in the literature.   
 In order to gain a clearer understanding of CSR disclosure/reporting and to 
ascertain the quantity and type of related research, the ABI/INFORM (2012) database 
was used to produce an overview of past peer-reviewed research.  This approach is 
consistent with the method used by Cronin et al. (2011) in their examination of green 
marketing strategies.  The content that is included is drawn from leading business 
journals through a structured keyword search of the literature (Cronin et al., 2011; 
Webster & Watson, 2002).  The method of data capture used by ABI/INFORM (2012) 
helps ensure that the results are focused and relevant.  Although the literature review 
suggested a paucity of CSR research with respect to CSR discloser/reporting, it also 
revealed a variety of terms that have been used to describe the practice.  Thus, the initial 
stage of the literature review involved an examination of peer-reviewed articles that made 
reference in both the abstract and the text to any of the following key words: 
• Environmental Disclosure(s), 
• Social Disclosure(s), 
• Economic Disclosure(s), 
• Social, Economic and Environmental Disclosure(s), 
• Voluntary Disclosure(s), 
• Sustainability Reporting, 
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• CSR Reporting and 
• Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
A comparison of the quantity of research for each type of disclosure is depicted in 
Table 1.       
Table 1 























Disclosure  0 0 0 0 3 123 443 246 815 
Environ 
Disclosure 0 0 0 1 6 111 623 393 1,134 
Economic 








0 0 0 0 0 0 20 15 35 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 0 2 0 13 69 345 1,315 633 2,377 
CSR  
Disclosure 0 0 0 0 0 3 57 82 142 
CSR 
Reporting 0 0 0 0 0 1 186 205 392 
Sustain 
Reporting 0 0 0 0 0 7 458 293 758 
Total 0 2 0 14 78 605 3,348 1,992 6,039 
Note: Environ Disclosure=Environmental Disclosure, Sustain Reporting=Sustainability 
Reporting 
 
Quantity of CSR Disclosure Research   
Of these search criteria, the term that was first to appear in the literature was 
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voluntary disclosures.  This term has been used to describe information that is voluntarily 
provided to financial markets and investors to meet their information needs (Boesso & 
Kumar, 2007).  These voluntary disclosures differ from the financial information that 
companies are mandated to provide.  Instead, voluntary disclosures include social, 
environmental and economic information, which often varies across companies (Chen & 
Bouvain, 2009).  
The term voluntary disclosures first appeared in the literature in the 1950’s.  
While there was no reference to the phrase during the 1960’s, articles on the topic once 
again emerged in the 1970’s and the number began to grow.  Of all of the terms used to 
describe non-financial reporting, voluntary disclosures have appeared in the literature the 
most often with a total of 2,377 articles.  While this term has often been used, it is less 
specific than other terms that have been examined.   
Within ABI/INFORM (2012), environmental disclosure(s) were found to be the 
focus of 1,134 peer-reviewed articles.  Slightly less interest was shown for social 
disclosure(s) and economic disclosure(s) with 815 and 13 peer-reviewed articles 
respectively.  Substantially fewer peer-reviewed studies have focused on more than one 
type of disclosure.  For instance, only 408 studies have been published to date that 
examine some combination of social, environmental and economic reporting.   
 Additionally, only 534 peer-reviewed articles have been focused on CSR 
disclosure(s), CSR reporting and Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting.  
Sustainability reporting has been the emphasis of 758 articles.  Interestingly, all but 11 of 
the studies focused on CSR and sustainability reporting research have appeared since the 
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year 2000.  The increasing quantity of disclosure research is a signal of increased interest 
in this area.   
 ABI/INFORM (2012) was once again utilized to gauge the quantity of CSR 
performance research.  A closer look reveals several interesting trends.  As shown in 
Table 2, performance research more than tripled from the 1960s to the 1970’s and then  
Table 2 























Perform 1 3 6 57 81 623 2,216 994 3,981 
Environ 
 0 0 0 1  8 543 2,579 1,196 4,327 
Perform 
Two 
Combo 0  0 0 0 0 12 155 155  322 
Econ 
Perform  1 14  63 202 898 5,008 11,214  3,609 21,009 
Three 
Combo   0 0  0 0 0 0  24 9  33 
Total  2 17  69  260 987 6,186  16,188 5,808 29,517 
Note: Social Perform=Social Performance, Environ Perform=Environmental 
Performance and Econ Perform=Economic Performance 
 
grew exponentially after that point. Amongst the three primary types, economic 
performance has received the most attention with 21,009 peer-reviewed articles.  This is 
more than two and half times the number of articles focused on environmental 
performance and social performance combined.  Environmental performance and social 
performance have been the focus of 4,327 and 3,981 peer-reviewed articles respectively.   
In comparing CSR performance research and CSR disclosure research, it is clear 
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that CSR disclosure has received less attention from researchers.  Interestingly, social 
activities, which have received the least attention in CSR performance research, have 
received greater attention in disclosure research.  It is also important to note that there 
was a lag in time between performance research becoming of interest to scholars and the 
appearance of disclosure research in business journals. 
Time Lag 
 As shown in Table 1, little disclosure research took place prior to 1990 and that 
which did appear focused primarily focused on voluntary disclosure.  From 1990-1999, 
the number of publications that focused on either social or environmental disclosures 
grew steadily and was nearly uniformly split between the two.  There were relatively few 
studies that combined both social and environmental disclosures between 1990 and 1999, 
but that number grew significantly between 2000 and 2009.  While the percentage of 
articles that focused on voluntary disclosure remained large, the majority focused on 
some component of CSR disclosures/reporting.   
 Performance research, depicted in Table 3, took time to gain momentum but did 
so much more quickly than disclosure research.  From 1980 to 1989, there were nearly 
13 times more peer-reviewed articles focused on types of performance than on disclosure.  
While the magnitude of difference slipped between 1990 and 1999, there were still more 
than 10 times more articles focused on performance.  The performance articles were 
nearly five times greater than the number of disclosure articles between 2000 and 2009.   
Since 2010, the magnitude of difference has continued to decrease.  However, there is 
still nearly three times more CSR performance research published than CSR disclosure 
research.  The increased number of CSR disclosure studies and the decreasing magnitude 
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Table 3 











1970-79 14 260 18.57 
1980-89 78 987 12.65 
1990-99 605 6186 10.22 
2000-09 3,348 16188 4.84 
2010-12 1,992 5808 2.92 
TOTAL 6037 29,429 4.87 
 
difference could be a sign of greater recognition within the academic community that 
CSR disclosure strategies are an important area of study.  A review of the CSR disclosure 
research, however, portrays a narrow band of academic scholarship.   
A Narrow Band of Research 
A review of all CSR disclosure research shows that the majority of research has 
been published in accounting journals.  This is illustrated further in Table 4, which shows 
the top 10 journals for CSR disclosure research based on the quantity of research 
published to date.  Considering the common bond with financial disclosures, it is not 
surprising that accounting scholars have focused on CSR disclosures.  However, the 
accounting discipline’s dominance has led to a narrow range of research.  This has 
focused on three areas:  (1) descriptive analysis of disclosures across countries and time 
periods, (2) examination of the impact of disclosures on corporate social and financial 
performance and (3) empirical research examining the determinants of reporting 
	   26	  
(Reverte, 2009), with much of the research examining volume related to CSR disclosure.  
Disclosure volume has been assessed in a variety of ways: 
• Page count (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers, 1995), 
Table 4 
Top 10 Journals for CSR Disclosure Research 
 
Journal 
Number of CSR 
Disclosure Articles 
Published to Date 
Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal 594 
Journal of Business Ethics  510 
Social Responsibility Journal 204 
Managerial Auditing Journal 189 
Journal of Intellectual Capital 158 
Corporate Governance 110 
Journal of HRCA: Human 
Resource Costing & Accounting 95 
Journal of Accounting Research 90 
Accounting Horizons 87 
Business Strategy and the 
Environment 70 
 
• Word count (Deegan & Gordon, 1996), 
• Sentence count (Hackston & Milne, 1996) and 
• Information bursts (Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath & Wood, 2009).  
The Relevance of CSR Disclosures to Marketing 
 While CSR reporting research has been dominated by other disciplines, the topic 
is relevant to marketing scholars (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  Companies have 
increasingly focused on corporate social responsibility and for those whose stakeholders 
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are aware, there is significant benefit.  Even knowledge of a single activity or initiative 
may affect the consumers’ beliefs, attributions, attitudes and identification (Sen et al., 
2006).  When consumers are aware of the firm’s approach to CSR, a company is not only 
viewed as socially responsible, but consumers are more likely to purchase from them 
(Sen et al., 2006).  The benefits to the company, however, are not restricted to 
consumption.  Employment seeking behaviors may also be impacted positively (Turban 
& Greening, 1997).  CSR initiatives, when reported, have been shown to have a favorable 
effect on how stakeholders think, feel and act toward a company and its brand (Hoeffler 
& Keller, 2002; Sen et al. 2006).   
 The firm’s approach to CSR reflects it perspective on societal obligation and can 
also have significant impact on its corporate reputation (Ellen, Webb & Mohr, 2006).  
Given the level of competition in most industries today, corporate reputation is critical 
(Aaker, 2005) and CSR provides a means by which to repair and/or refine it.  Multiple 
studies have suggested that reputation management is a major reason for companies to 
engage in CSR activities and then to disclose them (Bebbington et al., 2008; Brown et al., 
2009; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  
 Reputation has been defined as the “set of corporate associations that individuals 
outside an organization believe are central, enduring and distinctive to the organization” 
(Brown et al., 2006, 104).  The issue companies face, however, is that despite their 
investment, stakeholders are often unaware of the CSR initiatives companies undertake.  
In fact, awareness of CSR initiatives is fairly low (Sen et al., 2006).  This presents a 
significant obstacle for those firms that recognize the impact that CSR can have in 
helping them shape their reputation in the market place (Sen et al., 2006). 
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 CSR reporting can help a company overcome this obstacle because it provides an 
opportunity to engage stakeholders in an ongoing dialogue (GRI, 2012; Nikolaeva & 
Bicho, 2011).  In their stakeholder-oriented definition of marketing management, 
Gundlach and Wilkie (2010) suggest that the role of marketing management is to 
determine and implement those activities that involve “creating, communicating, 
delivering and exchanging offerings that have value for customers and other stakeholders, 
as well as society at large” (p. 91).  Public relations and advertising have long been seen 
as activities that can help the firm communicate the impact of its CSR activities to 
stakeholders (Carter, 2006).  CSR reporting has also been shown to be an effective 
communications tool because it can be used to engage stakeholders and address their 
concerns (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; GRI, 2012; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; 
Sweeney & Coughlan, 2008).   
 The firm’s success is dependent on meaningful relationships with its stakeholders 
and a focus on shared values.  By sharing the firm’s CSR initiatives and disclosing its 
social, environmental and economic impact, marketers are able to engage with multiple 
stakeholder groups, build lasting relationships and thus create value for the firm 
(Bhattacharya & Korschun 2008; Ferrell et al. 2010; Hult et al., 2011).  It is for these 
reasons that Nikolaeva & Bicho (2011, 152) conclude “the magnitude and the scope of 
CSR reporting should be studied more extensively by marketing scholars.”  
Types of Research 
Descriptive Analysis  
A number of researchers have used descriptive analysis to review CSR disclosure 
practices.  The studies they have conducted have examined single companies over an 
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extended period (Deegan et al., 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 1989), multiple companies in a 
single country (e.g. Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Campbell, Craven & Shrives, 2003; 
Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Ho & Taylor, 2007; Patten, 1991; Roberts & Koeplin, 2007) 
and multiple companies across multiple countries (Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000; Chen & 
Bouvain, 2009).  Unfortunately, differences in sample selection and the method of 
measurement have often made the comparison of studies difficult.  
 Single company longitudinal studies have examined the CSR reporting practices 
of companies in Australia and the United States.  Guthrie and Parker (1989) reviewed the 
reporting practices of an Australian company, BHP Ltd. from 1885-1985.  A separate 
study examined the period from 1983-1997 (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin, 2002).  Both 
studies showed CSR reporting practices to be extremely variable.  Rather than a 
consistent pattern of growth, disclosures fluctuated over time between growth and 
decline.  The intervals between peaks in disclosure volume also varied widely.  In fact, 
researchers found little relationship between timing of observed peaks and key economic 
events affecting BHP (Deegan et al., 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 1989).  Hogner’s (1982) 
study of US Steel produced similar results.   
An examination of single country studies has shown that, over time, both the type 
and volume of CSR disclosures vary substantially between companies (Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2008; Campbell, Craven & Shrives, 2003; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Ho & 
Taylor, 2007; Patten, 1991; Roberts & Koeplin, 2007).  The variance in volume and type 
of disclosure observed across studies is believed to be associated with firm size (Cormier 
& Gordon, 2001; Cormier, Gordon & Magnan, 2004), the industry (Patten, 1991) and the 
ownership of the firm (Cormier & Gordon, 2001).   
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Results from a comparative analysis of firms across two or more countries also 
showed problems with generalizability (Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000).  For example, CSR 
reporting by British and German companies in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries revealed differences in both the amount and type of disclosures across 
countries.  The magnitude of difference between countries, however, was difficult to 
interpret due to incongruity between the samples with regard to industry size and 
composition (Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000).   
Chen and Bouvain (2009) compared CSR reporting across firms in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Germany.  The authors found significant 
differences between countries in how frequently the terms society, community and 
customer were mentioned in reports.  There were also significant differences between 
industries in the frequency of environmental issues.  The use of third party assurance was 
also examined and significant differences were observed (Chen & Bouvain, 2009).  In 
cross-country comparisons, the influence of culture, political pressure and other 
contextual factors was evident (Adams, 2002).   
Descriptive studies have played an important role in shaping the overall body of 
CSR disclosure research.  Variances in the volume, quality and type of disclosures have 
led researchers to try and better understand the factors that contribute to the observed 
differences.  Across studies, firm size and industry classification have been highly 
correlated with the firm’s CSR disclosure volume.  As a result, both of these have been 
used as control variables in other studies.  Contextual factors have also been revealed that 
deserve greater attention (Adams, 2002). 
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Impact of Corporate Social and Financial Performance on Disclosure 
As described earlier, scholarly interest in CSR performance preceded disclosure 
research.  Given that fact, it is not surprising that researchers would be interested in 
understanding whether a relationship exists between performance and the volume and 
quality of CSR disclosures.  Thus far, studies that focused on the association between 
social disclosures and social performance have produced inconsistent results.  For 
example, Ingram & Frazier (1980) suggested a weak association between social 
performance and the level of CSR disclosure while Wiseman (1982) suggested no 
relationship at all.  In reviewing the body of past research, Roman, Hayibor and Able 
(1999) proposed that the number of studies that suggest a negative relationship is 
overstated and that the relationship is actually positive to neutral.   
Little interest was shown in the determinants of CSR reporting before Ullmann’s 
(1985) conceptual framework was proposed.  That framework provided a more robust 
explanation for the relationship between performance and disclosure.  It placed a heavy 
emphasis on stakeholder theory and helped scholars begin to understand the theoretical 
underpinnings of CSR disclosure.  As a result, more researchers became interested in the 
topic and began to examine the determinants of CSR disclosure.  Today, Ullmann’s 
influence continues to be seen with frequent citations of his work.    
Determinants of Reporting 
 Following Ullmann (1985), disclosure research focused on the determinants of 
CSR disclosure volume and quality.  While a broad array of independent variables has 
been examined, researchers have tended to focus on only a small number of variables in a 
given study rather than look at larger constructs.  For example, Cowen, Ferreri & Parker 
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(1987) sought to understand the relationship between individual corporate characteristics 
and the types of CSR disclosure made by a company.  Consistent with previous studies, 
both size and industry category appeared to have some influence.  Additionally, the 
presence of a CSR committee was shown to also to have an effect.   
 Another study examined a series of financial determinants and environmental 
disclosure volume (Cormier & Magnan, 1999).  The results revealed a positive 
relationship between a firm’s risk, its reliance on capital markets and its trading volume 
and the dependent variable of disclosure volume.  Concentrated ownership was 
negatively related to disclosure volume.    
 While financial determinants continue to be included in many studies, some 
scholars have examined unique variables.  In a study focused on Spanish companies, 
Reverte (2009) included industry environmental sensitivity, international listing, media 
exposure and leverage as independent variables.  Each was positively related to 
disclosure volume.  In another study, Gamerschlag et al. (2011) included company 
visibility, profitability, share ownership structure and a company's relationship with its 
stakeholders in the United States as independent variables in their study.  All, except for 
profitability, were related positively to the volume and quality of CSR disclosures.  
Two Competing Theoretical Models  
 Ullmann (1985) was the first to propose a theoretical model to explain the broader 
determinants of CSR disclosures.  Given the model’s origins, it is not surprising that it 
relied heavily on performance.  The model consisted of three high level constructs:  
stakeholder power, strategic posture and past and present economic performance.   
 The first construct, stakeholder power, was based on earlier work by Keim (1978) 
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who suggested that investors, acting out of self-interest, would encourage social action 
from which they would derive benefit.  This construct describes the power of 
stakeholders to control resources critical to the organization and suggests the firm is 
forced to respond in a way that satisfies stakeholders’ demands.  While Ullmann (1985) 
focused on the power of stakeholders, he was primarily interested in stockholders.       
This was because of their ability to control critical resources.   
 Strategic posture, the second construct, described the approach managers take in 
responding to stakeholder’s demands.  Ullmann (1985) suggests that this can either be 
passive or active.  This is consistent with Sethi’s (1974) model of corporate social 
performance that includes social obligation, social responsibility and social 
responsiveness.  A passive posture would reflect social obligation and an active posture 
would reflect social responsiveness (Carroll, 1999).  Ultimately, Ullmann was interested 
in how a firm chooses to strategically influence its key stakeholders in its efforts to 
achieve interdependence.   
 The final construct, past and present financial performance, dictates how much 
attention social issues get from the firm’s leadership.  Financial performance also helps 
determine the firm’s ability to meet stakeholder demands.  Ullmann (1985) suggests that 
the interactions among the three constructs will determine if CSR performance or CSR 
disclosure is used to manage relationships with stakeholders.   
 Roberts (1992) applied Ullmann’s (1985) theoretical model as a means to 
understand the determinants of CSR disclosure.  The dependent variable chosen by 
Roberts as a proxy for CSR disclosure was the rating each of the 130 participating 
companies received in a 1986 study conducted by the Council on Economic Priorities.  
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Three independent variables were selected to represent and assess stakeholder power.  
Previous research suggested that dispersed ownership heightened pressure for 
management to disclose CSR activities (Ulmann, 1985).  As a result, one independent 
variable chosen for inclusion was the percentage of shareholders and owners who held 
more than 5% of common stock in the period prior to disclosure.  The amount of funding 
contributed to a corporate political action committee (PAC) in the period prior to the CSR 
disclosure was included as a second variable.  It was chosen because it was considered to 
be representative of stakeholder power resulting from regulatory and political pressure.  
The third variable chosen was the debt to equity ratio in the period prior to the CSR 
disclosure.  This variable was included because it was believed that the more dependent 
the firm was on debt financing, the greater the firm’s response to creditors’ expectations.  
Of these variables, only PAC contributions (p < .05) and debt-equity ratio (p < .10) were 
shown to be significant in predicting CSR disclosure.   
 Roberts (1992) then used two variables to represent Ullmann’s (1985) strategic 
posture construct.  It had been assumed that companies that take an active posture toward 
CSR require a large public affairs staff (Marcus & Kaufman, 1988).  Given this 
assumption, the average size of the public affairs staff from 1983-1984 was included as 
one variable representing strategic posture.  Since the existence of a corporate-funded 
philanthropic foundation demonstrated an active posture toward CSR, a dichotomous 
variable was used to denote the existence of such a foundation from 1983-1984.  Both 
variables were found be significant; the existence of a philanthropic foundation was 
highly significant at .001.   
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 Ullmann’s (1985) third construct was past and present financial performance. 
Roberts (1992) proposed using both an accounting measure (return on equity) and a stock 
market based measure (systemic risk) to test the relationship between economic 
performance and the level of disclosure.  Return on equity was significantly related at      
p <0.05 and systemic risk was significantly related at p < 0.10.  There were also three 
other measures: age of the corporation, industry classification and company size.       
Only age (p < .01) and industry (p < .05) had the expected positive relationship. 
 Adams (2002) offered an alternative theoretical model to explain the factors that 
determine a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  This new model also organized the variables 
into three high-level constructs:  (1) corporate characteristics, (2) general contextual 
factors and (3) internal contextual factors.  Adams (2002) model was influenced by 
research that preceded her model.  Since it was proposed, it has served to influence the 
individual variables researchers have examined. 
 Of Adam’s (2002) three constructs, the corporate characteristics construct has 
been studied frequently.  Company size (e.g. Adams et al., 1998; Boesso and Kumar, 
2007; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Cormier, Gordon & Magnan, 2004; Cowen et al., 1987; 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Ho & Taylor, 2007; Reverte, 2009) and industry group or 
classification (e.g. Adams, Hill, & Roberts 1998; Cowen et al., 1987; Deegan & Gordon, 
1996; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Islam & Deegan, 2010; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011; 
Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992) have produced consistent results and have been shown to be 
positively related to the volume and quality of CSR disclosures.  Results have suggested 
corporate age, systemic risk and lagged profit are also related positively (Roberts, 1992).   
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Profit in the same period, however, has failed to produce consistent results across studies 
(e. g. Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Choi, Kwak & Choe, 2010; 
Cowen et al., 1987; Ismail & Chandler, 2005; Neu et al., 1998; Reverte, 2009; Patten, 
1991).  
 The construct that Adams (2002) described as general contextual factors includes 
the combined effect of social, political, economic and cultural factors, as well as the 
influence of time, world events, stakeholder power and media.  Adams (2002), however, 
noted that these factors can be difficult to measure and their effects difficult to isolate.  It 
can also be difficult to understand what if any relationships exist between the factors.  
Variables that might also apply within this construct are political and economic 
turbulence (Berthon et al., 2008; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hristache & Iacob, 
2012), disclosures on the Web (Joshi & Gao, 2009) and media pressure (Islam & Deegan, 
2010, Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012).   
 Internal contextual factors include attitudes that influence the firm’s reporting 
strategy or internal processes that influence the preparation of the CSR report (Adams, 
2002).  Only two studies that focused on CSR disclosures have explored corporate 
leadership as a variable.  Campbell (2000) looked at changes in the company chairperson 
while Cowen et al. (1987) focused on a defined committee that focused on CSR reporting 
within the Board of Directors.  Adams (2002) went on to suggest additional variables that 
might adequately represent internal contextual factors.  Corporate structure and 
governance procedures, involvement of accountants and involvement of stakeholders 
were identified as additional process factors while views on reporting practices, perceived 
costs and benefits of reporting and corporate culture were identified as possible 
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attitudinal factors.  While the constructs and resulting variables are grounded in theory, it 
is important to keep in mind that this model has not been examined empirically in the 
literature.  
A Shifting Environment 
 There have been numerous environmental changes since Ullmann (1985) and 
Adams (2002) proposed their theoretical models.  It is unclear what impact this 
environmental turbulence might have on the determinants of CSR reporting and the 
quantity and quality of CSR disclosures.  It is also not known how the firm’s disclosure 
strategy may be affected.  
 Corporate scandals and perceived greed associated with Enron, AIG, BP, 
Goldman Sachs and WorldCom have fostered a growing skepticism about corporate 
motives and actions (Arvidsson, 2010).  Over the past decade, trust in corporate America 
has fallen to an all-time low (Edelman, 2009; Waddock & Googins, 2011).  As a result, 
stakeholders desire for authenticity, accountability and transparency have increased   
(Becchetti, Ciciretti, Hasan & Kobeissi, 2012; Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Waddock & 
Googins, 2011; Wagner, Lutz & Weitz, 2009).  These growing expectations may reflect 
an increase in the strength of stakeholders and their role in helping change how society 
defines legitimacy.   
 With increased awareness about climate change and increased attention to 
corporate business practices, society’s concern about the environmental, social and 
ethical commitment of business has also increased (Arvidsson, 2010).  Actions have been 
taken at both national and international levels to help ensure that better corporate 
governance leads to an improved relationship between business and society (Arvidsson, 
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2010).  This suggests that institutions may play an increasing role and reflects the need to 
more fully examine the role of both stakeholders and institutions in influencing CSR 
disclosure strategy.   
 The environment that business operates in has also become more turbulent.  
Beginning in 2008, the world’s economies began to experience a significant economic 
downturn with threats of default by debt-ridden nations like Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
(Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Kennedy & Neuger, 2012).  Political discontent has led to 
protests and changes in governments and there have been increased calls for greater 
accountability among businesses (Kolk & Perego, 2010).  Interest in sustainability has 
also grown (Dilling, 2010) and social media has taken a dominant role in the way we 
communicate (Berthon et al., 2012).  While Adams (2002) suggested that social, political, 
cultural and economic context could play a role in influencing a firm’s CSR reporting, 
these factors were not empirically tested.  This suggests a knowledge gap regarding the 
role of these contextual factors in influencing a firm’s disclosure strategy.  This gap could 
be addressed by examining the role of certain institutional measures of environmental 
turbulence as determinants.    
 In addition to changes in the external environment, there has also been a major 
shift in the way data can be collected and analyzed.  In past studies, content analysis has 
often been used to assess the quantity and quality of the reporting.  This is often done by 
counting the words, sentences, paragraphs or pages devoted to CSR disclosures in the 
firm’s annual report or on the company’s website.  This method is time consuming.  
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As a result, it has resulted in the examination of only a small number of disclosures (e.g. 
Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Cowen et al., 1987; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Roberts, 1992; 
Patten, 2002).  
 The limitations of content analysis have often led scholars to reduce the scope of 
their research to a single type of disclosure (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Cowen et al., 
1987; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Patten, 2002; Roberts, 1992).  For example, some 
research has focused on social disclosures (e.g. Abbott & Monsen, 1979; Bebbington et 
al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2003: O’Dwyer, 2002; Patten, 1991; Ullmann, 1985) while 
other research has focused almost exclusively on environmental reporting (e.g. Brammer 
& Pavelin, 2008; Cormier et al., 2005: Wiseman, 1982).  Past research has also been 
limited geographically to countries like Japan, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the United States  (e.g. Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000; Boesso & 
Kumar, 2007; Gray et al., 1995; Ho & Taylor, 2007; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Patten, 
2002; Reverte, 2009; Roberts & Koeplin, 2007).  Researchers have tended to examine 
CSR disclosures in a single country or across a small group of countries rather than 
across a large multi-country sample (e.g. Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000; Boesso & Kumar, 
2007; Chapple & Moon, 2005; Cormier, Gordon & Magnan, 2004; Gray et al., 1995; Ho 
& Taylor, 2007; Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Patten, 2002; Reverte, 2009; Roberts & 
Koeplin, 2007.)  Finally, the limitations of content analysis have made it difficult to 
examine more than a single year of reporting across a series of firms (Cormier, Magnan 
& Van Velthoven, 2005; Gamerschlag et al., 2011).   
 Improved technology has helped eliminate some of the issues associated with 
early content analysis and has made disclosures more accessible to researchers who want 
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to analyze both quantity and quality.  Electronic tools that help eliminate issues of inter-
rater reliability can now be used to carry out content analysis (Chen & Bouvain, 2009).  
At the same time, normative standards for CSR and guidelines for CSR disclosures have 
also begun to shape corporate practices as the environment in which companies find 
themselves continues to evolve (KPMG, 2011).  The use of reporting standards has also 
helped create more uniform disclosures across geographic boundaries by creating a 
benchmark for reporting (KPMG, 2011; Sherman, 2009).  Limited attention has been 
paid to the impact that these normative standards may have on CSR disclosures.   
 There are multiple frameworks for voluntary CSR communication and disclosure, 
which provide companies with latitude in choosing issues on which to report (Chen & 
Bouvain, 2009).  Of these frameworks, the GRI’s G3 Guidelines, which were released in 
late 2006, are used most often (Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Waddock & Googins, 2011).  
Today, more than 1000 firms globally report their social, environmental and economic 
impact according to GRI (Arvidsson, 2010).   
 The G3 Guidelines include reporting indicators that provide a platform for 
reporting a firm’s economic, environmental and social impact.  The Guidelines rely on a 
series of application levels which allow companies to communicate to stakeholders the 
specific elements of the GRI Reporting Framework that have been applied in their 
disclosures.  Organizations have flexibility to decide which principles and indicators to 
use and to what extent they wish to apply the Guidelines.  Additionally, the standards 
provide firms with the ability through assurance to communicate to stakeholders that 
certain requirements have been met (Gamerschlag et al., 2011; GRI, 2012; Moneva et al., 
2006).   
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GRI Guidelines 
 Firms that rely on the GRI Guidelines to guide their disclosure strategy are faced 
with three strategic three decisions.  First, the firm must choose whether to declare a 
specific application level in reporting its CSR activities or merely reference the principles 
from the GRI framework.  Second, the firm that chooses to declare an application level 
must determine how much it wishes to disclose and which level it wishes to declare.  
Finally, a firm must decide whether it will have the disclosure reporting assured by a 
third-party.   
 The GRI Guidelines contain three different types of disclosures:  a profile and 
strategy overview, a summary of the firm’s management approach and performance 
indicators.  Together, these help set the context for understanding the firm’s strategy and 
its approach to CSR.  Performance indicators help describe the firm’s economic, 
environmental and social performance.  Labor, human rights, society and product 
responsibility also offer greater insight into the firm’s social performance. (GRI, 2011; 
Sherman, 2009) 
 Each category has a corresponding set of core and additional performance 
indicators that are described in more detail in Appendix B.  Core Indicators are generally 
applicable across region and sector and have been developed through GRI’s multi-
stakeholder processes (GRI, 2011; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  Topics that may be 
material for some organizations, but not for others or those that would be considered 
emerging are labeled as additional indicators (GRI, 2011).   
 The three G3 application levels are labeled A, B or C.  Application level C is 
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intended for organizations at the entry level of reporting.  These organizations meet the 
minimum reporting criteria of 10 core performance indicators and have included 
economic, environmental and social indicators in the firm’s CSR report.  Organizations at 
application level B have not only demonstrated an increasing application of the reporting 
framework, these organizations have policies in place to guide sustainability 
performance.  Application level B requires an organization to report on 20 core 
performance indicators.  In addition to the economic, environmental and social indicators, 
the organizations have also included labor practices and decent work, human rights and 
product responsibility indicators in the CSR report.  Those organizations with an 
application level A reflect the broadest application of the GRI Guidelines.  As such, at 
this level, all 50 GRI core performance indicators must be represented, either with data or 
a valid explanation for why the indicator is not reported (GRI, 2011; Sherman, 2009).  
Additionally, any firm that has utilized external assurance may self-declare a “plus” (+) 
with any one of the three application levels (GRI, 2011).  This multi-dimensional 
framework provides stakeholders with an easy way to understand which elements of the 
GRI reporting framework a company has applied.  It also includes affirmation of 
assurance that a firm is operating within society’s expectations.  
Every three years, KPMG conducts an international survey that examines CSR-
related information from hundreds of companies.  Since 1993, the survey has tracked 
both historic trends and emerging issues in CSR reporting.  The survey provides data 
from the top 250 companies listed on the Fortune Global 500 (G250).  It also includes the 
100 largest companies by revenue (N100) from 22 countries.  A listing of those countries 
is provided in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Countries in the N100 
 
  Australia Italy South Korea 
Brazil Japan Spain 
Canada  Mexico Sweden 
Czech Republic Netherlands  Switzerland 
Denmark Norway United Kingdom 
Finland Portugal United States 
France  Romania   
Hungary South Africa   
  
In 2005, only 50% of the G250 companies reported on CSR initiatives.  Both the 
2008 and 2011 KPMG surveys showed significant increases to 81% and 95% 
respectively.  The number of reporting companies that followed the GRI Guidelines from 
both the G250 and the N100 grew as well.  In 2008, 77% of the G250 followed the GRI 
Guidelines and this number increased to 80% by 2011.  Of the N100 companies, 69% 
followed the GRI Guidelines in both 2008 and 2011 (KPMG, 2011, 20). 
  It has been suggested that slow adoption rates for the GRI and lower-than-desired 
compliance levels imply that the business case for reporting is elusive (Gray, 2006).  The 
introduction of the GRI G3 Guidelines seemed to challenge that assumption and adoption 
of the reporting standards began to increase.  Use is also more widespread geographically 
and now includes both the developed and developing world (KPMG, 2011).  These 
results, however, did not come without a significant investment of time and money to 
promote the guidelines around the globe.   
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Hypothesis Development 
 Reporting practices have evolved since Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002) 
proposed their models.  Normative standards like the GRI Guidelines have helped create 
more uniform CSR disclosures across geographic boundaries, but the firm is still left to 
make key strategic choices about its disclosure strategy.  The GRI G3 provides the firm 
with guidance as to what should be reported and how it should be reported.  Ultimately, 
the firm must determine the application level and whether or not to have third-party 
assurance to communicate to stakeholders that certain requirements have been met 
(Gamerschlag et al., 2011; GRI, 2012; Moneva et al., 2006).   
 It is unclear how all of these factors influence a firm’s disclosure strategy and 
ultimately, the quantity and quality of CSR reporting.  Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath and 
Wood (2009) call for future research that explores the determinants of CSR reporting.  
There is also a need to assess a broader and more representative sample of firms across 
industries (Sweeney & Coughlan, 2011).  This current research responds to these calls for 
additional investigation in today’s dynamic marketplace with the primary objective of 
answering the following major research question.   
 RQ:   What factors are determinants of a company’s CSR disclosure strategy?   
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
 A new model is proposed here that could be useful to both scholars and 
practitioners.  It utilizes constructs from Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002) along with 
two new constructs.  Corporate characteristics were included as a key construct by 
Adams (2002) and the firm’s financial profile was included as a key construct by 
Ullmann (1985).  These two constructs will be used to replicate past research, while two 
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other constructs will serve to extend it.    
 Instead of merely focusing on the stakeholders’ power to control resources, this 
research will build upon Ullmann’s (1985) model by examining the involvement of the 
firm’s stakeholders.  It will also build upon Adams (2002) model by examining both 
national and industry focused measures that exemplify environmental turbulence.  This 
research provides more specificity than Adams (2002) model, which focused broadly on 
general contextual factors.  It also extends the literature because it draws upon a 
theoretical framework that includes legitimacy, institutional and stakeholder theories.   
 The firm’s CSR disclosure strategy is comprised of the GRI G3 levels and the 
firm’s decision to seek third-party assurance.  While GRI application levels have not been 
examined in past research, they do represent a fundamental choice that firms must make 
in executing their disclosure strategy.  The second construct is the presence or absence of 
third party assurance.  This is considered a key strategic decision because CSR 
disclosures may have more legitimacy if reviewed and assured by an independent third 
party.  This is similar to financial data that are viewed as reliable because of the auditing 
process (Holder-Webb et al., 2009).  The presence or absence of third party assurance is 
also included in the data reported to GRI.  Determining whether or not to pursue third 
party assurance is an important decision the firm must make in determining its disclosure 
strategy.  Taken together, these provide a simple and uniform method by which to reflect 
the quality of a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  (See Figure 1 in Chapter 1.)  
 Non-financial corporate characteristics.  The determinants of reporting are 
explained by four constructs.  The first of these, non-financial corporate characteristics, 
includes items described by Adams (2002) including corporate structure and governance 
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procedures, involvement of accountants and involvement of stakeholders as additional 
process factors.  Views on reporting practices, perceived costs and benefits of reporting 
and corporate culture were identified as possible attitudinal factors.  Legitimacy, 
stakeholder and institutional theories all support this construct.   
 Past research has examined industry membership (Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston 
& Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992), corporate age (Roberts, 1992), corporate 
size (Adams et al., 1998; Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991), 
business complexity (Boesso & Kumar, 2007), country of origin (Cowen et al., 1987, 
Guthrie & Parker, 1990) and percentage of ownership held by management and 
shareholders holding more than 5% (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Cormier, Magnan & Van 
Velthoven, 2005; Roberts, 1992).  Each of these could serve as possible variables to 
assess the relationship between this construct and the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  
Other potential variables include the presence of a CSR reporting committee within the 
board of directors, corporate governance structure as defined by the ratio of independent 
board members and the total number of board members (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Cowen 
et al., 1987).    
 Consistent with prior research, four variables have been chosen to represent these 
non-financial corporate characteristics.  They include the firm size (Cormier & Magnan, 
2003; Cormier, Magnan &Van Velthoven, 2005), firm age (Roberts, 1992), the presence 
of a board level CSR committee (Cowen et al., 1987) and the corporate governance 
structure (Boesso & Kumar, 2007).  Legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional theories all 
support this construct. 
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 Firm Size.  Given the increased scrutiny larger firms receive from stakeholders; 
the size of a company is believed to be related to CSR activities.  Larger companies are 
also believed to have more resources that can be directed to the disclosure of CSR 
activities.  As a result, firm size has been examined in past research and been shown to be 
positively related to the quantity and quality of CSR disclosures (Adams et al., 1998; 
Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991).  Company size has been 
measured in a variety of different ways; including number of employees (Boesso & 
Kumar (2007), total asset value (Gamerschlag et al. (2011), sales volume (Fortanier, Kolk 
& Pinkse, 2011) and Fortune 500 rank (Cowen et al., 1987).   
 Hypothesis 1a:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s size and the  
     GRI application level it chooses to declare. 
 Hypothesis 1b:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s size and the  
     firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
 Firm age.  Older firms are believed to have a more established reputation, which 
would in turn make them more likely to report their CSR activities than newer firms.  The 
majority of studies that have examined the relationship between firm age and CSR 
disclosures have found a positive relationship (Bayoud, Kavanagh & Slaughter, 2012; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Roberts, 1992).  One study, which examined the relationship 
between the firm’s age and environmental disclosure, produced an opposite effect and the 
relationship was shown to be negative (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009).  It is important to note 
that firm age in that study was defined as the length of time that the company had been 
listed on the Chinese stock exchange.  Given these conflicting results and our intention to 
examine CSR disclosure strategies rather than the level of environmental disclosure, it is 
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necessary to examine this relationship.  Based on the majority of findings, age is expected 
to be directly related to firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  
Hypothesis 2a:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s age and the  
     GRI application level it chooses to declare.   
 Hypothesis 2b:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s age and the  
     firm’s choice of third party assurance.   
 Business complexity.  Some scholars have suggested that the complexity that 
results from geographic or business unit diversification leads many firms to be less 
transparent (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith 2004; Ge & McVay, 2010).  Others have 
suggested that increased levels of business complexity lead to increases in the flow of 
information (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Dilling, 2010; Healy & Palepu, 2001).  Despite 
these opposing viewpoints, the relationship between business complexity and the volume 
and quality of CSR disclosures were examined and found to be significant (Boesso & 
Kumar, 2007; Dilling, 2010).  Given the increased complexity of business and the 
expectations of stakeholders, the relationship between business complexity and CSR 
disclosure strategy will be examined.  Both the number of operating segments and 
geographic segments within a firm has been used previously to measure business 
complexity (Ge & McVay, 2010).   
Hypothesis 3a:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s business  
     complexity and the GRI application level it chooses to declare. 
 Hypothesis 3b:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s business  
      complexity and the firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
 Board level CSR committee.  The presence of a board level committee focused on 
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CSR has been examined previously in relation to social disclosure.  It was believed that 
the influence of this committee could lead to increased volume of reporting.  However, 
the only effect that was shown was with the volume of human resource related 
disclosures (Cowen et al., 1987).  Given the role of the board and its interest in the firm’s 
strategy, it is hypothesized here that such a committee would likely have a greater effect 
on the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.   
 Hypothesis 4a:  There is a positive relationship between the presence of a board  
     level CSR committee with the firm and the GRI application level  
     it chooses to declare. 
 Hypothesis 4b:  There is a positive relationship between the presence of a board  
     level CSR committee with the firm and the firm’s choice of third  
     party assurance. 
  
 Corporate governance structure.  Corporate governance structures have shifted 
beyond their traditional focus.  Boards of directors are increasingly expected to address 
the needs of both shareholders and other stakeholders who may be impacted by the firm 
(Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Eng & Mak, 2003; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Zahra & 
Stanton, 1988).  In corporate governance structures, independent directors are uniquely 
qualified to monitor the actions of the firm’s corporate managers and help ensure all 
stakeholders are represented (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Eng & Mak, 2003; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Prado-Lorenzo, et al., 2009).  Because of this, 
scholars have suggested that firms with a higher ratio of independent board members to 
the total number of board members may be more likely to provide a higher quantity and 
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quality of disclosures for stakeholders (Eccles et al., 2001).   
 Hypothesis 5a:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s corporate  
       governance structure and the GRI application level it chooses  
       to declare. 
   Hypothesis 5b:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s corporate  
       governance structure and the firm’s choice of third party   
       assurance. 
 Financial performance of the firm.  Firm financial performance, the model’s 
second construct, is included to varying degrees in the models proposed by both Ullmann 
(1985) and Adams (2002).  In Ullmann’s model, the firm’s financial performance serves 
as a distinct construct.  With Adams, financial performance falls under corporate 
characteristics.  This construct finds its theoretical support in both legitimacy and 
institutional theories   
 Prior research has examined the impact of return on assets (Patten, 1991, 
Hackston & Milne, 1996), one year lagged return on assets (Patten, 1991), change in net 
income from the previous period (Patten, 1991), systematic risk – Beta (Roberts, 1992) 
and the firm's annual stock market return (Cormier, Magnan & Van Velthoven, 2005) on 
the volume and quality of CSR disclosures.  This relationship has been previously 
examined using several different variables.  However, results have been mixed.  The 
variables that have been used include return on equity (Roberts, 1992), current return on 
assets (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991), one year lagged return on assets (Gray, et 
al, 1995; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992) and systemic risk 
(Roberts, 1992).    
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 Lagged return on equity.  Current return on equity (ROE) seemingly has no 
relationship to the volume or quality of CSR disclosures (Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991).  One year lagged return on equity based on the prior year has 
not been shown to be related (Patten, 1991).  Results with other measures of lagged 
profits have varied, but most have shown no relationship (Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston 
& Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992).  However, there are two notable 
exceptions.  Of those studies, one has shown a negative relationship (Patten, 1991).  The 
other study (Roberts, 1992) showed a positive relationship between profitability and CSR 
disclosures using the average growth in return on equity over four years.  
 Prior results suggest that there would be no relationship between either current or 
one year lagged ROE and the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  A longer lag time of 4 
years, however, has been shown to be positive (Roberts, 1992).  While past results have 
been mixed, there may be some relationship between financial performance over several 
periods and the timing of strategy development (Cormier et al., 2004).  
Hypothesis 6a:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s average growth 
      in return on equity, over the 4-year period prior to reporting and  
      the GRI application level it chooses to declare.   
Hypothesis 6b:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s average  
     growth in return on equity, over the 4-year period prior to  
                reporting and the firm’s choice of third party assurance.   
 Systematic risk – Beta.  Research suggests a negative relationship exists between 
systematic risk and the level of social disclosure (Roberts, 1992).  This is consistent with 
prior findings that showed evidence of a relationship between the firm’s CSR activities 
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and its improved access to capital (McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis 1988; Moskowitz, 
1972).  With reduced systematic risk, capital markets may view firms that have a 
strategy to report CSR disclosures at the highest level as more legitimate and less risky.   
Hypothesis 7a:  There is a negative relationship between the firm’s systematic  
      risk and the GRI application level it chooses to declare.  
 Hypothesis 7b:  There is a negative relationship between the firm’s systematic  
     risk and the firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
Stakeholder involvement.  In Ullmann’s (1985) model, the concept of 
stakeholder power is focused on the ability to control resources.  However, the variables 
that were later tested by Roberts (1992) seem to speak less to the power of the 
stakeholder and more to the firm’s involvement with stakeholders.  These variables 
included the number of public affairs staff members (Roberts, 1992), the level of 
corporate philanthropy and corporate sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation (Roberts, 
1992), government fines (Huang & Kung, 2010; Neu et al., 1998), print and online media 
exposure (Cormier et al., 2005; Neu et al., 1998) and corporate reputation (Bebbington et 
al., 2008; Othman et al., 2011).  
The global marketplace is increasingly complex.  Companies face an increasing 
number of obstacles that have the potential to influence both their reputation and their 
financial success (Crittenden, Crittenden, Ferrell, Ferrell & Pinney, 2011).  Given these 
challenges and the increased need for firms to gain support from stakeholders, a more 
representative set of variables are required to measure stakeholder involvement 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  This construct builds upon Ullmann’s (1985) theoretical 
model and the original research of Roberts (1992) and is supported by stakeholder theory. 
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 Number of stakeholders referenced.  Stakeholder theory suggests that firms 
interact with multiple stakeholders in the course of operating.  Scholars have suggested 
that stakeholder interactions create greater risk for t3333he firm, which requires 
managers to engage in more comprehensive reporting (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; 
Hult, Mena, Ferrell & Ferrell 2011).  The stakeholder’s influence on the firm’s strategy 
and its allocation of resources would then be reflected in content of the reports (Hill & 
Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995).   
 One study examined the relationship between stakeholder pressure and the level 
of social disclosure (Kateb, 2012).  In the study, which included 200 French firms, the 
number of contractual and diffuse stakeholders mentioned in the president’s message of 
CSR disclosures was the independent variable.  The results indicated that there was no 
relationship between the number of stakeholders and the level of reporting (Kateb, 2012).  
Despite this result, stakeholder theory suggests that the multiple stakeholders may create 
greater risk, which could potentially impact the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy (Clarkson, 
1995; Freeman, 1984; Hult, Mena, Ferrell & Ferrell 2011; Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012).  
Given the tenets of stakeholder theory and the difference in dependent variables being 
examined here, a relationship may exist between the number of stakeholders referenced 
and the firm’s disclosure strategy.  
Hypothesis 8a:  There is a positive relationship between the number of   
                    stakeholders a firm references in its CSR disclosure and the GRI  
     application level it chooses to declare.  
Hypothesis 8b:  There is a positive relationship between the number of   
      stakeholders a firm references in its CSR disclosure and the  
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      firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
 Corporate sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation.  Corporate philanthropy is 
one of the four primary CSR dimensions described by Carroll (1991).  Some have argued 
that corporate philanthropy has been used as a way to secure legitimization (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Chen, Patten & Roberts, 2008).  A corporate philanthropic foundation 
provides the firm with a means to make strategic contributions (Rosebush, 1987).  The 
relationship between corporate sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation and the firm’s 
level of social disclosure has also been examined in previous research and found to be 
highly significant (Roberts, 1992).  Since Roberts examined this relationship, others have 
examined the relationship between charitable giving and social performance.  However, 
those studies have looked at the actual contribution level rather than whether a firm had a 
corporate charitable foundation (Chen, Patten & Roberts, 2008).   
Hypothesis 9a:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s corporate  
     sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation and the GRI   
     application level it chooses to declare.  
Hypothesis 9b:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s corporate  
     sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation and the firm’s   
      choice of third party assurance. 
 Media exposure.  Media exposure has been previously examined as a measure of 
society’s interest in a company’s CSR activities, specifically those focused on the 
environment (Aerts, Cormier & Magnan, 2006; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Cormier & 
Magnan, 2003; Cormier, Magnan & Van Velthoven, 2005; Kennedy, 2008; Neu et al., 
1998, Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012).  This variable is represented by the number of news 
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items produced about the firm in a given year.  Data in past studies have been drawn from 
the Factiva (Brammer & Pavelin 2008), ABI/Inform (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Cormier, 
Magnan & Van Velthoven, 2005) and Lexis/Nexis databases (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  
 One limitation of these databases is that they do not include forms of social media 
like Twitter and blogs.  Social media analysis tools like Edelman’s TweetLevel and 
BlogLevel do exist to analyze these mediums, however, they have only been used in 
academic research on a limited basis and have multiple limitations (Solis & Webber, 
2012: Tinati, Carr, Hall & Bentwood, 2012).  
Hypothesis 10a: There is a positive relationship between the firm’s media   
      exposure and the GRI application level it chooses to declare. 
            Hypothesis 10b: There is a positive relationship between the firm’s media   
      exposure and the firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
           Corporate reputation.  Reputational risk and reputational benefit are mentioned 
twenty-six times in the GRI G3 Guidelines (GRI, 2012).  Each reference is made to 
convey the importance of CSR activities and suggest the benefit of disclosing those 
activities.  Scholars have also suggested there is a need for strategically focused CSR 
disclosures.  These allow the firm to communicate with stakeholders about what is being 
done to manage a wide range of environmental, social and economic risks.  This, 
however, has only been minimally examined (Bebbington et al., 2008; Friedman & 
Miles, 2001; Unerman, 2008).  Examining this variable would also build upon the models 
proposed by Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002). 
Hypothesis 11a:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s corporate  
        reputation and the GRI application level it chooses to declare. 
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            Hypothesis 11b:  There is a positive relationship between the firm’s corporate  
                      reputation and the firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
  
 Environmental turbulence.  The fourth dimension of the model is environmental 
turbulence which is commonly defined as the loss of stability created by difficult to 
predict environmental changes (Berthon et al., 2008; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; 
Hristache & Iacob, 2012).  This is an example of institutional pressures described in the 
literature (Jackson & Apostolakou 2010) and consists of both economic and political 
turbulence.  Both forms of turbulence have been measured using a variety of variables.  
While these factors can be difficult to measure, a variety of variables have been described 
in the literature by management, economics and political science scholars that would be 
appropriate.  
 While this dimension represents a subset of the general contextual factors 
described by Adams (2002), it goes well beyond what had been previously described in 
the literature.  This research provides more specificity in terms of the variables.  It also 
includes both national and industry focused measures, which builds upon previous 
research. 
 Economic turbulence.  Economic turbulence has often been described in the 
literature as rapid, unpredictable changes to the environment that affect corporate 
performance (Hristache & Iacob, 2012).  More specifically, the term has been used to 
refer to both national level changes and to industry level changes (Akhter & Daly, 2009; 
Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998, 2004; Rissman, 1997).  
Because of its unpredictability, economic turbulence presents significant challenges to 
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the firm, but it may be beneficial.  That is, more mature organizations may emerge from 
economic turbulence better prepared to build or strengthen an existing competitive 
advantage (Hristache & Iacob, 2012).   
   Some scholars have examined economic turbulence in terms of national level 
changes to gross domestic product, unemployment, inflation and/or interest rates (Akhter 
& Daly, 2009; Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998, 2004; 
Rissman, 1997).  Others have focused on industry level changes as a means to 
demonstrate instability in the environment and a variety of measures have been 
suggested.  These include industry concentration, product dynamism, industry 
vulnerability, demand instability and market share instability (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1993, Hambrick, 1983, Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995).  Given that both economic 
measures and industry focused measures have been used, both types are reflected in the 
hypotheses.   
Hypothesis 12a:  There is a positive relationship between standard deviation of       
       per capita GDP growth and the GRI application level it chooses 
to declare. 
 Hypothesis 12b:  There is a positive relationship between standard deviation of 
       per capita GDP growth and the firm’s choice of third party       
assurance. 
Hypothesis 13a:  There is a positive relationship between performance   
 risk and the GRI application level it chooses to declare. 
 Hypothesis 13b:  There is a positive relationship between performance   
        risk and the firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
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            Hypothesis 14a:  There is a positive relationship between demand    
 instability and the GRI application level it chooses to declare. 
            Hypothesis 14b:  There is a positive relationship between demand    
 instability and the firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
 Political turbulence.  Political turbulence has been examined using components 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to assess political risks for a firm’s 
country of origin (Adsera et al., 2003).  The ICRG is based on the observations of 
country level experts who assess each country based on twelve components of political 
risk (International Country Risk Guide, 2012).  Since its introduction, researchers have 
commonly chosen specific components based on the research focus (Williams & 
Siddique, 2008).   
The components, which will be used for this research, have been used in prior 
research (Adsera et al., 2003, Ackerman & Tobin, 2005).  The first component, 
government stability, assesses the government’s ability to carry out its priorities.  It 
specifically examines government unity, legislative strength and popular support in a 
given country.  The second component, law and order, assesses the strength and 
impartiality of a country’s legal system and the citizen’s willingness to observe the law.  
The final component, bureaucratic quality, assesses the expertise, quality and stability of 
elected officials and their administrative counterparts (ICRG, 2012).   
 Hypothesis 15a:  There is a positive relationship between the Government   
       Stability Index for the firm’s country of origin and the   
           GRI application level it chooses to declare. 
Hypothesis 15b:  There is a positive relationship between the Government   
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       Stability Index for the firm’s country of origin and the   
           firm’s choice of third party assurance.  
Hypothesis 16a:  There is a positive relationship between the Law and Order  
       Index for the firm’s country of origin and the GRI application  
       level it chooses to declare. 
Hypothesis 16b:  There is a positive relationship between the Law and Order  
       Index for the firm’s country of origin and the firm’s choice of  
       third party assurance. 
Hypothesis 17a:  There is a positive relationship between the Bureaucracy Quality 
        Index for the firm’s country of origin and the GRI application  
                   level it chooses to declare. 
Hypothesis 17b:  There is a positive relationship between the Bureaucracy  Quality 
                   Index for the firm’s country of origin and the firm’s choice of  
                       third party assurance. 
 The intent of this research is to understand the factors that influence a firm’s 
disclosure strategy.  Theory and prior research suggest that there are four major 
constructs that ultimately lead to disclosure strategy.  The next chapter describes the 





Methodology   
 This research examined the relationship between a four-dimensional model of 
reporting determinants and a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  The proposed model which 
built on legitimacy, institutional and stakeholder theories includes the following 
constructs: corporate characteristics, the firm’s financial performance, the involvement of 
the firm’s stakeholders and environmental turbulence.  The firm’s CSR disclosure 
strategy is reflected in the combination of the GRI application level chosen by the firm 
and the presence or absence of third party assurance. 
Executive Interviews 
 Executive interviews are a common means used by researchers to explore CSR 
reporting (Adams, 2002; Arviddson, 2010; Islam & Deegan, 2010).  In addition to the 
quantitative study outlined below, this research included interviews with five executives 
responsible for determining their firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  The purpose of these 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews (Fontana & Frey, 1994) was to gain additional 
insights into the suitability of the proposed constructs and a greater understanding of the 
managerial implications of this research.  The constructs and expected relationships 




 The executives participating in this phase of the research were drawn from firms 
included in the GRI registry used subsequently in the quantitative research.  A total of 
five executives were interviewed with no two executives from the same company, 
country or sector.  The inclusion of different industries helped provide a reasonable cross-
section of different views of CSR reporting.  The interview procedure was identical for 
all participants (Arviddson, 2010).  Each was contacted prior to the interview. At that 
time, the purpose of the interviews was described and the executive was invited to 
participate.  All interviews were conducted by phone unless proximity allowed for an in-
person interview (Arviddson, 2010; Owen, Swift & Hunt, 2001).  A list of the questions 
that were used to guide the semi-structured interview process is included in Appendix B. 
Quantitative Study 
 The quantitative portion of this study relied on data derived from the GRI registry, 
Capital IQ and public databases.  This research was the first to use either the GRI registry 
or Capital IQ in CSR disclosure research.  Of the secondary sources, only public 
databases have been used previously in CSR disclosure research.  Past studies focused on 
the content and quality of disclosures have relied upon either primary data developed 
through the use of content analysis or data derived from annual reports.  However, the 
generalizability of studies that have used content analysis has been limited because 
content analysis limits the number of firms that can be examined (Gamerschlag et al., 
2011).   
 While GRI guidelines have been previously examined (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 
2011), the research did not examine the GRI disclosure registry.  The registry lists all 
CSR disclosures that have employed the GRI guidelines between 1999 and 2012.  While 
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the types of data that have been collected have varied over the life of the registry, all 
entries between 2007 and 2012 have included the organizations name, its size, its sector, 
country, region, the type of report, the application level and manner in which the 
application level was determined.  Listings for 2011 and 2012 also include the 
organizational type (state, public or private) and whether or not the firm is listed.   
Sample 
 A sample of global publicly traded firms was drawn from a reporting registry 
maintained by the Global Reporting Initiative.  The registry lists firms that have utilized 
the reporting framework since it was first introduced.  However, only those firms that 
have used the G3 Guidelines in their reporting are focused on here.  Before the G3 
Guidelines were adopted in  2006, GRI had fewer requirements and required the firm to 
make fewer choices regarding their disclosure strategy.  Table 6 shows the number of 
reports with an application level of A, B or C that have been entered into the registry 
since the G3 Guidelines were introduced. 
 The data set was derived from the 2011 GRI Registry. It included 1,909 public 
and private firms as well as cooperatives, non-profit organizations, partnerships, state 
owned companies and subsidiaries with an application level of A+, A, B+, B, C+ or C.  
Table 7 shows the distribution of all of the 2011 GRI reports across application levels. 
 In order to arrive at a final data set, several steps were taken.  First, because this 
study focused on publicly traded firms, organizations that are not listed on a stock 
exchange were eliminated.  Second, firms with duplicate listings were removed.  Finally, 
an additional group of companies was eliminated because of limited available data in 
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Capital IQ and public databases.  This resulted in a sample of 535 global publicly traded 
firms.  This sample represents 28% of the total reports. 
Table 6 
Number of Records with Application Levels in the GRI Registry 
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  With logistic regression, Hair, et al. (2010) recommend that there be both an 
analysis sample and a holdout sample.  While the data set used in this study exceeds the 
400 recommended for the analysis sample, it is not large enough to provide for a similar 
sized holdout sample.  This eliminates the possibility of a holdout sample that would 
allow for validation of the logistic model  (Hair et al., 2010; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
2000).  Hair, et al. (2010) also suggest a minimum of 10 observations per independent 
variable. With 17 hypotheses, this would suggest a minimum of sample of 170 and this 
sample meets that requirement.   
Analytical Approach 
 In past CSR disclosure research, logistic regression has been commonly used by 
scholars (e.g. Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang, 2011; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Kolk & Pinkse, 
2010; Perez-Batres, Miller & Pisani, 2010; Roberts, 1992).  In this research, the 
dependent variables that were analyzed were categorical rather than metric.  Given the 
nature of these variables, logistic regression was also considered the most appropriate 
analytical approach for this study.  Using this method provides researchers with the 
ability to analyze categorical dependent variables and metric and non-metric independent 
variables.  It also provides robust statistical tests and a wide range of diagnostic tools to 
ensure goodness of fit (Hair et al., 2010; Hosmer & Stanley, 2000).  
Variable Delineation 
Dependent Variable 
 The combination of the firm’s chosen GRI application level and the presence or 




legitimacy and is consistent with both stakeholder and legitimacy theories.  In this 
research, the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy was represented by two variables: 
application level and third-party assurance.  With the GRI G3 Guidelines, there are three 
application levels from which the firm may choose.  That which is chosen is dependent 
on the firm’s level of reporting and its adherence to the corresponding standards outlined 
by GRI.  The application levels, A, B, C are variables and were coded in this study as 3, 2 
or 1 respectively.  While this dependent variable has not been examined in past research, 
it does represent a fundamental choice that firms must make in executing their disclosure 
strategy.   
 The presence or absence of third party assurance was the second dependent 
variable. This is considered a key strategic decision because CSR disclosures may have 
more legitimacy if reviewed and assured by an independent third party.  This is similar to 
financial data that are viewed as reliable because the have been subjected to an audit 
(Holder-Webb, et al 2009).  The presence or absence of third party assurance is also 
included in the data reported to GRI.  Determining whether or not to pursue third party 
assurance is an important decision the firm must make in determining its disclosure 
strategy.  The presence or absence of third party assurance was coded as 1 or 0.   
Exploratory variables used in the study are described below and are organized by 
construct consistent with the model proposed for this research.  
Explanatory Variables 
 The explanatory variables in this study reflect constructs in the proposed four-
dimensional model of reporting determinants as shown in Figure 1 (see Chapter 1).  
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The proposed model builds upon the previous work of Ullmann (1985) and Adams 
(2002).  It includes the following constructs:  non-financial corporate characteristics, the 
firm’s financial performance, the involvement of the firm’s stakeholders and 
environmental turbulence.   
 Non-financial corporate characteristics.  Consistent with prior research, four 
variables have been chosen to represent non-financial corporate characteristics.  They 
include the firm size (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Cormier, Magnan &Van Velthoven, 
2005), firm age (Roberts, 1992), the presence of a board level CSR committee (Cowen et 
al., 1987) and the corporate governance structure (Boesso & Kumar, 2007). 
 Firm size.  Company size has been measured in a variety of different ways, 
including number of employees, total asset value, sales volume and Fortune 500 rank.  
Consistent with Boesso & Kumar (2007) and Prado-Lorenzo, Gallego-Alvarez and 
Garcia-Sanchez (2009), company size will be measured as the number of employees.  
The firm’s number of employees will be drawn from the Capital IQ database.   
 Firm age.  Older firms are believed to have a more established reputation, which 
would in turn make them more likely to report their CSR activities than newer firms.  The 
majority of studies that have examined the relationship between firm age and CSR 
disclosures have reported a positive linear relationship (Bayoud et al., 2012; Dhaliwal et 
al., 2012; Roberts, 1992).  This variable is defined as the age of the corporation from 
inception to 2011 and will be derived from the Capital IQ database.  
 Board level CSR committee.  The presence of a board level committee focused on 
CSR has been examined previously in relation to social disclosure.  It was believed that 
the influence of this committee could lead to increased volume of reporting.  However, 
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the only effect that was shown was with the volume of human resource related 
disclosures (Cowen et al., 1987).  Given the role of the board and its interest in the firm’s 
strategy, it is hypothesized here that such a committee would likely have a greater effect 
to the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  The presence or absence of a board level CSR 
committee is coded as 1 or 0 respectively. This data will be drawn from the Capital IQ 
database. 
 Business complexity.  Given the increased complexity of business and the 
expectations of stakeholders, business complexity is included as a variable.  Both the 
number of operating segments and geographic segments within a firm have been used 
previously to measure business complexity (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Ge & McVay, 2010; 
Hossain & Hammami, 2009).  As such, both will be collected for 2011.  This data will be 
drawn primarily from the Capital IQ database.  When data is not available in the Capital 
IQ database, it will be drawn from the firm’s annual report or its 10-K filings.   
 Corporate governance structure.  Scholars have suggested that firms with a 
higher ratio of independent board members to the total number of board members may be 
more likely to provide stakeholders with a higher quantity and quality of CSR disclosures 
(Boesso & Kumar, 2007: Eccles et al., 2001).  This ratio will be calculated using the 
number of independent directors and total directors for each firm as found in the Capital 
IQ database.  
 Financial performance of the firm.  Firm financial performance is included in 
the models proposed by both Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002).  The variables that have 
been used include: return on equity (Roberts, 1992), current return on assets (Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991), one year lagged return on assets (Gray, et al, 1995; Hackston 
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& Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992) and systemic risk (Roberts, 1992).    
 Lagged return on equity. Based on prior results, neither current nor one year 
lagged ROE were found to have a relationship with the quantity and quality of CSR 
reporting (Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1991).  Given those 
findings, this study will examine the average ROE over the four-year period preceding 
the disclosure (Roberts, 1992).  This data will be drawn from the Capital IQ database.   
 Systematic risk – Beta.  With reduced systematic risk, capital markets may view 
firms that have a strategy to report CSR disclosures at the highest level as more 
legitimate and less risky (Roberts, 1992).  Systematic risk will be measured using the 
firm’s Beta for 2011, which will be drawn from the Capital IQ database.  
Stakeholder involvement.  The involvement of the firm with its stakeholders will 
be represented by four specific variables.  These include: (1) the number of stakeholders 
referenced (Kateb, 2012), (2) the sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation (Roberts, 
1992), (3) media exposure (Hyman & Mathur 2005; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011) and (4) 
corporate reputation (Othman et al., 2011).   
 Number of stakeholders referenced. The recognition of stakeholders and the 
firm’s involvement with them can be noted in the firm’s reference to stakeholders in the 
company’s disclosures.  This information will be drawn from the firm’s CSR disclosure 
and will measure the number of stakeholders a firm references in its 2011 CSR disclosure 
(Hill & Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995; Kateb, 2012). 
 Corporate sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation.  In this research, the 
sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation is coded as 1 and the absence of sponsorship of 
a philanthropic foundation is coded as 0.  The source is consistent with past research. 
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This information will be derived from the Europa International Foundation Directory 
(Roberts, 1992).   
 Media exposure.  Consistent with past research, media exposure will be defined 
as the number of news items produced about the firm in a given year (Fiss & Zajac, 
2006).  Companies included in the sample will be reviewed for the number of stories 
published which focus on the firm’s CSR and CSR disclosures in 2011 (Zyglidopoulos et 
al, 2012).  This information will be drawn from the Lexis/Nexis database includes news 
from selected major US and international publications, news wire services and transcripts 
of radio and television broadcast (Hyman & Mathur 2005; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  
  Corporate reputation.  Several measures have been used to assess reputation, 
including the Fortune Most Admired Companies and Financial Times Most Respected 
Companies.  These measures and others like them are limited in that they only assess a 
small subset of companies.  They also tend to have a financial bias (Othman et al., 2011).  
In order to address these issues, some scholars have used the Reputation Institute’s 
RepTrak as a measure of corporate reputation (Fombrun & Pan, 2006; Vidaver-Cohen 
2007).  This index has been tested with over 2,000 companies globally and measures the 
perceptions across countries, industries and stakeholder segments based on seven 
dimensions.  These include product and services, performance, citizenship, workplace, 
governance, leadership and innovation (Reputation Institute, 2012).  Specific dimensions 
can be isolated.  This was done in recent research where citizenship, workplace and 
governance were isolated to create a measure of CSR reputation (Othman et al., 2011).  
For this research, the Reputation Institute’s RepTrak will be used.   
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 Environmental turbulence.  The fourth dimension of the model is environmental 
turbulence.  This dimension represents a subset of the general contextual factors 
described by Adams (2002).  The factors include social, political and economic factors.  
Environmental turbulence is commonly defined as the loss of stability created by difficult 
to predict environmental changes (Berthon et al., 2008; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).  
This consists of both economic and political turbulence, which have been measured using 
a variety of variables.  While these factors can be difficult to measure, a variety of 
variables have been described in the literature by management, economics and political 
science scholars that would be appropriate.  
 Economic turbulence.  Economic turbulence has often been described in the 
literature in terms of both national and industry level changes (Akhter & Daly, 2009; 
Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998, 2004; Rissman, 1997).  
Previous research has examined economic turbulence is terms of changes to gross 
domestic product, unemployment, inflation and/or interest rates (Akhter & Daly, 2009; 
Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998, 2004; Rissman, 1997).  
Other scholars have focused on industry concentration, product dynamism, industry 
vulnerability, demand instability and market share instability (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1993, Hambrick, 1983, Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995).  Given that both economic 
measures and industry focused measures have been used, both types are reflected in the 
hypotheses.  GDP will be calculated as standard deviation of per capita GDP growth from 
2008-2011 for the firm’s country origin.  Performance risk will be calculated as the 
average coefficient of variation of firm’s return on assets within a given industry.  The 
firm’s return on assets will be derived from the Capital IQ database.  Demand instability 
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will be calculated as the average coefficient of variation of firm’s sales within a given 
industry. The firm’s return on sales will be derived from the Capital IQ database.   
 Political turbulence.  Political turbulence has been examined using components 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to assess political risks for the firm’s 
country of origin (Adsera et al., 2003).  The components, which will be used for this 
research, include:  government stability, law and order and bureaucratic quality.  Each 
one has been used in prior research and will focus on the firm’s country of origin (Adsera 
et al., 2003, Ackerman & Tobin, 2005).  
  The Government Stability Index consists of three subcomponents - government 
unity, legislative strength and popular support.  These are rated on a five-point scale 
where a score of 4 represents a very low risk and score of 0 signals a very high risk 
(ICRG, 2012).  The Law and Order Index is comprised of two subcomponents that are 
assessed separately using a four-point scale.  A score of 3 is considered high and signals 
very low risk.  Conversely, a score of 0 signals very high risk (ICRG, 2012).  The 
Bureaucracy Quality Index is used to measure the expertise, quality and stability of 
elected officials and their administrative counterparts.  The index components are rated 
on a five-point scale.  A score high of 4 points equates to high quality and low risk. 
Conversely, a score of 0 signals poor quality and high risk (ICRG, 2012). 
Control Variables  
 Industry.  The firm’s industry membership has also been controlled for in a 
number of studies (Adams et al., 1998; Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston & Milne, 1996; 
Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992).  This has been done because 
certain industries are known to have more intense competition, more scrutiny from 
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regulators and/or be more visible by consumers.  These factors could impact both the 
firm’s level of CSR activity and the disclosure practices.   
In early disclosure research, dummy variables were used to distinguish between 
those industries considered high and low profile.  However, the industries that met this 
definition varied.  Roberts (1992) considered the automobile, aviation and oil industries 
to be high profile while Patten (1991) focused on petroleum, chemical and forest/paper 
industries.  Later research by Gamerschlag et al. (2011) and Hackston & Milne (2006) 
included 18 and 21 industries respectively.  The number of industries was based on the 
stock exchange of the country where the research was conducted - New Zealand Stock 
Exchange and the Deutsche Boerse.  However, just as with the early research, there was a 
wide variation in the types of industries that met this definition. 
 The Global Reporting Initiative database categorizes companies into 38 different 
industries.  While there is some variance between GRI’s categories and those used 
previously, there is also substantial overlap.  For the purpose of this research, 20 
industries, consistent with those used in prior research, will be considered high profile.  
Rather than referring to a specific industry, GRI instead uses the term sector.  For this 
research, however, the terms will be considered interchangeable.   
 In the GRI database, companies within the computer industry have two different 
sector categories from which to choose.  One of these is referred to as the computer 
sector while the other is referred to as the technology hardware sector.  Because of the 
similarity between them, the two categories have been collapsed to one in this research.  
GRI also reports energy and water utilities as separate sectors, which differs from past 
research.  In order to remain consistent, energy and water utilities have been combined 
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(Gamerschlag et al., 2011; Hackston & Milne, 2006).  A total listing of industries can be 
found in.  Firms, which are considered high profile, are coded as 1 while firms in other 
sectors will be coded as 0.  Consistent with Gamerschlag et al. (2011), dummy variables 
will also be used to distinguish among industries.  
Table 8 
High Profile Industry Sectors 
 
High Profile Sectors Low Profile Sectors 
Automotive Agriculture 
Aviation Commercial Services 
Chemicals Conglomerates 
Computers/Technology Hardware* Construction Materials 
Construction Equipment 
Consumer Durables Healthcare Services 
Energy Household and Personal Products 
Utilities (Energy &Water)* Metal Products 
Financial Services Non-Profit/Services 
Food and Beverage Other 
Forest and Paper Public Agency 




Real Estate Waste Management 
Retail  
Telecommunications  
Textiles and Apparel  
Tobacco  
 * denotes industry sectors that have been combined into a single sector         
    based on past research 
 
 Number of countries.  Given the use of country level variables, an additional 
control variable will be the number of countries in which the company operates.  The 
number of geographic segments within a firm has been used previously to measure 
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business complexity (Ge & McVay, 2010).  This information will be collected for 
2011and will be drawn from the Capital IQ database (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Hossain & 
Hammami, 2009).   
 Number of years reporting.  Because of the potential impact of past reporting, 
the number of years a firm has reported using the GRI will be used as a control.  This 
number will be drawn from the GRI registry and will examine the period from 1999 to 
2011.  
 CSR reporting practices have evolved with increased societal expectations and the 
introduction and widespread adoption of reporting standards like the GRI Guidelines 
(Gamerschlag et al., 2011 Gray et al., 1988; Hubbard, 2011; KPMG, 2011; Neu et al., 
1998; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011; Yongvanich & Guthrie, 2006).  Given this evolution, 
theoretical models proposed by Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002) may no longer be 
sufficient to explain the factors that influence a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  This 
study examines a four-dimensional model that builds upon those theoretical models and 
incorporates research findings and environmental changes that have taken place since 
their introduction.  By testing the variables that have been outlined here, both scholars 
and practitioners will be provided with a more comprehensive understanding of the 
factors that influence a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy. 
  





Data Analysis and Findings 
 The semi-structured, in-depth interviews  were designed to gain additional 
insights into the suitability of the proposed constructs and to provide insight into each 
firm’s approach to reporting.  The executives who participated are responsible for 
determining their firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  Care was taken to ensure that firms 
who employ these individuals were drawn from the GRI Registry.  Each company that 
participated represented different industries and displayed different approaches to 
reporting. 
 Two interviews were initially undertaken with firms based in the United States.   
The first was conducted with Company A, an automobile manufacturer that has shown a 
long-standing commitment to CSR reporting.  The second was conducted with Company 
B, a multi-national pharmaceutical company, that is committed to CSR reporting but 
whose reporting history has been somewhat inconsistent.  Often the periods where the 
firm has reported have then been followed by periods of silence.  
 While the companies’ reporting patterns were different, the interviews revealed 
similar strategies.  Both companies had chosen to remain consistent in their choice of 
application level and neither had chosen to pursue third party assurance.  The executives 
also revealed that the focus of their firm’s CSR reports and the chosen application level 
are generally determined by a small group of employees who are knowledgeable about 
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the composite parts of the report.  These interviews did not suggest anything that would 
raise concern about the suitability of the proposed constructs.  
 During the period that the data set was being assembled, two additional executive 
interviews were conducted with multi-national companies that are headquartered in 
Europe.  Each of the companies also has a long history of CSR reporting.  The first of 
these interviews was with Company C, which provides staffing, placement, career and 
outsourcing services as well as human resources consulting.  The company was included 
in this research because of its reporting history and its focus on services rather than 
tangible products.  The second interview was conducted with Company D, which 
develops, produces, and sells products in the healthcare, material science and crop 
science markets.  This company was included in this portion of the research because of its 
broad business mix and its long-standing use of the GRI framework including third part 
assurance.  
 Both companies expressed a strong interest in being more strategic in their 
reporting.  However, each is at a different stage.  Company C indicated that its past 
efforts had often lacked uniformity.  In an effort to change this, representatives in each 
country where they have operations were given a questionnaire and asked to collect the 
required data from different parts of the organization.  Another important step was the 
review and approval of the company’s CSR report by the board of directors reviewed and 
approved.  This took place for the first time in 2013. 
 Company D looks at CSR more holistically.  There are people throughout the 
organization who are responsible for sustainability and this includes a member of the 
Board of Directors as well as representatives from each division – healthcare, material 
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science, and crop science.  Decisions about the firm’s sustainability strategy are made by 
a committee, which meets three to four times per year to talk about activities and 
strategies related to sustainability.  These activities are then reported on an annual basis. 
Company D’s efforts have become even more imbedded in the organization.  In the 
future, the company’s CSR reporting will be incorporated into the annual report. 
 Companies C and D, just like Companies A and B, have chosen to remain 
consistent in their choice of application level.  One major difference amongst the 
companies is that Company D’s CSR report is assured by a third party. It was important 
that at least one of the companies interviewed includes third party assurance as part of its 
reporting strategy.  It is of note that while these additional interviews helped provide 
context, there continued to be nothing reported that would create concern about the 
suitability of the proposed constructs. 
 After the data set was assembled and analyzed, a final interview was conducted 
with Company E.  The company is a multi-national company that develops, produces, 
and markets consumer packaged goods that are distributed in the United States and select 
international markets.  The timing of this interview was chosen to help provide further 
context to the findings as well as to suggest potential future research questions.  In order 
to provide the broadest perspective, it was important to ensure all of the application levels 
were represented in this phase of the research.  
 Company E reports at the C application level and does not include third party 
assurance.  The firm’s disclosure strategy is to be actively prepared for issues that can be 
predicted rather than to be a leader in CSR reporting.  For those that cannot be predicted, 
the company responds reactively on a case-by-case basis.  In an effort to achieve this, 
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they monitor indicators and key forces within the industry as well as topics of interest to 
customers, shareholders, non-governmental organizations and government.   The risk 
level associated with each is determined and this helps to inform what will be reported.  
This determination rests with the Executive-VP level staff that is responsible for research 
and development, human resources, operations, legal and marketing.    
 The interview revealed that Company E places their stakeholders in high regard.    
If government proposes rules, information is shared with management and a plan of action 
is suggested.  If a non-governmental organization makes a request, the company weighs 
the public relations risks.  Shareholders also receive rapid attention.  Of all their 
stakeholders, however, alignment with customers and consumers is considered most 
critical.  Given their business model, they defined customers as those to whom they sell 
direct.  Consumers, on the other hand, are those who buy the firm’s products from their 
customers.   
 The company believes that their CSR program is young.  They recognize that they 
have to consider the type of company they are and who their stakeholders are.  They have 
not felt the need to move quickly, but rather to be consistent in their reporting.  They do 
not have their reports assured; however, many of the inputs are assured through other 
processes and organizations.  As a result, third party assurance of the report was thought 
to be redundant.   
 An additional topic that came up during the interview was impact of the UN 
Global Compact and other similar efforts. The UN Global Compact is a global initiative 
that is intended to align the strategies and operations of companies with certain principles 
that are focused on the environment human rights, labor, and anti-corruption (UN Global 
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Compact, 2013). The company has a long heritage of environmental concern, but has 
chosen to not sign on to the UN Global Compact or the Carbon Disclosure Project.  It is 
believed that signing on to either of these puts too much pressure on the company to drive 
faster or to a place that it does not wish to go.  Signing can also cause redundancy.  For 
example, they already report greenhouse gases.  Ultimately, the company wants to 
manage their own programs rather than ceding strategic choices to someone else.   
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variables 
The choice of application level communicates the firm’s level of reporting that 
has been undertaken and its adherence to the corresponding standards outlined by GRI.  
As shown in Table 9, firms in the data set are normally distributed across application 
levels with 38.7% of firms choosing level A, 42.4% of firms choosing level B and 19.9% 
choosing level C respectively.  This is not dissimilar from the 2011 GRI registry in which 
35% of firms chose level A, 36% of firms chose level B and 29% of firms chose level C.  
Table 9  
Application Level Distribution 
 
Application Level 
GRI Registry Data Set 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
A 671 35.1 207 38.7 
B 689 36.1 227 42.4 
C 549 28.8 101 19.9 
Total 1909 100 535 100 
 
 The second dependent variable is the presence or absence of third party assurance. 
Determining whether or not to pursue third party assurance is an important decision the 
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firm must make in choosing its disclosure strategy.  As shown in Table 10, firms are 
nearly equally divided in their choice with 51.2% choosing to pursue third party 
assurance and 48.8% choosing not to pursue third party assurance.  This differs from the 
2011 GRI registry.  There firms were not divided as equally, with 44.8% choosing to 
pursue third party assurance and 55.2% choosing not to pursue third party assurance.   
Table 10 
Assurance Determination Distribution 
 
Assurance GRI Registry Data Set 
Absence/Presence Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Presence  855 44.8 274 51.2 
Absence 1054 55.2 261 48.8 
Total 1909 100 535 100 
 
 The difference between the data set and the broader GRI may be explained by the 
types of organizations that are included in each.  The registry includes both public and 
private firms as well as cooperatives, non-profit organizations, partnerships, state owned 
companies and subsidiaries.  The data set is focused only on public firms which are 
required to provide an annual report to shareholders.  This requirement exposes firms to 
the value of third party assurance and may lead them to consider consistent approaches to 
reporting.   
Explanatory Variables 
 The explanatory variables in this study reflect constructs in the proposed four-
dimensional model of reporting determinants shown in Figure 1 (see Chapter 1).   
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It includes the following constructs:  non-financial corporate characteristics, the firm’s 
financial performance, the involvement of the firm’s stakeholders and environmental 
turbulence.  
 Non-financial corporate characteristics.  Firm size (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; 
Cormier, Magnan & Van Velthoven, 2005), firm age (Roberts, 1992), the presence of a 
board level CSR committee (Cowen et al., 1987) and the corporate governance structure 
(Boesso & Kumar, 2007) are variables used to represent non-financial corporate 
characteristics.  As shown in, firm size ranged from 10 to 552,445 employees, with a 
mean of 41,840.66 and a standard deviation of 69,251.81. Firms ranged in age from 3 to 
421 years, with a mean of 79.30 and a standard deviation of 58.71.  The number of 
business segments ranged from 0 to 25 with a mean of 4.31 and a standard deviation of 
2.91. The Corporate Governance ratio that is calculated using the number of independent 
directors and total directors for each firm ranged from 0 to .77 with a mean of .18 and a 
standard deviation of .15.  Finally, of the firms in the data set, 39.3% have a board level 
CSR committee while the remaining 60.7% of firms do not.  
Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics for Non-Financial Corporate Characteristics 
  N Range Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
Firm Size 535 552415 10 552425 41840.66 69251.8 
Firm Age 535 418 3 421 79.3 58.7 
CSR 
Committee 535 1 0 1     
Segments -
Business 535 25 0 25 4.31 2.91 
Corp Gov 
Ratio 535 0.77 0 0.77 0.18 0.15 
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 Financial performance of the firm.  Firm financial performance was represented 
by four year lagged return on equity (Roberts, 1992) and Beta (Roberts, 1992). 
Descriptive statistics for each of these variables can be found in Table 12.  Four year 
lagged return on equity ranged from -2.08 to 12.09 with a mean of .18 and a standard 
deviation of .61.  Given this range, the mean suggests that there may be a small number 
of companies who report scores near the maximum. A review of the raw data showed 5 
firms of 535 have lagged ROE above 1.  Beta ranges from -.27 to 3.35 with mean of .89 
and a standard deviation of .53.   
Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics for Financial Performance of the Firm 
  N Range Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Lagged ROE 535 14.17 -2.08 12.08 0.18 0.61 
Beta 535 3.62 -0.27 3.35 0.89 0.53 
              
 
Stakeholder involvement.  The involvement of the firm with its stakeholders is 
represented by four specific variables.  These include: (1) the number of stakeholders 
referenced (Kateb, 2012), (2) the sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation (Roberts, 
1992), (3) media exposure (Hyman & Mathur 2005; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011) and (4) 
corporate reputation (Othman et al., 2011).  Descriptive statistics for each of these 
variables can be found in Table 13.   
 The recognition of stakeholders and the firm’s involvement with them can be 
noted in the firm’s reference to stakeholders in the company’s disclosures.  The number 
of stakeholders referenced ranges from 1 to 22 with a mean of 7.36 and a standard 
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deviation of 2.32.  One company was a significant outlier with 22 stakeholders 
referenced.  The next largest was 14.  
 
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics for Stakeholder Involvement 
 
  N Range Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Stakeholders 535 21 1 22 7.36 2.32 
Corp Foundation 535 1 0 1 	  	   	  	  
Media Exposure 535 442 0 442 18.11 42.78 
Corp Reputation 103 81 0 81 67.26 9.75 
              
 
A corporate philanthropic foundation provides the firm with a means to make 
strategic contributions (Rosebush, 1987).  Of the firms studied here, 44.3% directed their 
philanthropic efforts through their corporate foundation.  The remaining 55.7% of firms 
did not have a corporate foundation.   
 Consistent with past research, media exposure was defined as the number of news 
items produced about the firm in a given year (Fiss & Zajac, 2006).  Companies included 
in the sample were reviewed for the number of stories published which focus on the 
firm’s CSR and CSR disclosures in 2011 (Zyglidopoulos et al, 2012).  For the data set, 
the number of news stories focused on CSR ranged from 0 to 442 with a mean of 18.11 
and a standard deviation of 42.78  
  One of the issues noted in the original proposal is that with studies used to 
evaluate reputation, there are often limited numbers of companies that are assessed.  In 
order to overcome this issue, some scholars have used the Reputation Institute’s RepTrak 
as a measure of corporate reputation (Fombrun & Pan, 2006; Othman et al., 2011; 
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Vidaver-Cohen 2007).  However, an examination of companies included in this data set 
revealed that only 103 of the 535 companies who report an application level have a 
publicly available RepTrak score.  This represented less than twenty percent. For these 
companies, reputation scores ranged from 42.79 to 81.00 with a mean of 67.26 and a 
standard deviation of 9.75.   
 Environmental turbulence.  Environmental turbulence consists of both 
economic and political turbulence.  Economic turbulence has often been described in the 
literature in terms of both national and industry level changes (Akhter & Daly, 2009; 
Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998, 2004; Rissman, 1997).  It is 
measured by standard deviation of per capita GDP growth, performance risk and demand 
instability.  GDP was calculated as standard deviation of per capita GDP growth from 
2008-2011 for the firm’s country of origin.  Political turbulence was measured by the 
Government Stability Index, the Law and Order Index and the Bureaucracy Quality 
Index.   
 As shown in Table 14, performance risk ranged from 0 to 6.50 with mean of .38 
and a standard deviation of .45.  Demand instability ranged from 0 to 8.55 with a mean of 
.38 and a standard deviation of .97.  The Government Stability Index scores ranged from 
5.00 to 10.63 with a mean of 7.21 and a standard deviation of 1.16.  The Law and Order 
Index scores ranged from 2.00 to 6.00 with a mean of 4.78 and a standard deviation of 
1.06.   The Bureaucracy Quality Index scores ranged from 1.00 to 4.00 with a mean of 
3.43 and a standard deviation of .79. 
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Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics for Environmental Turbulence 
  N Range Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
GDP 
Growth 535 5.47 0.76 6.23 3.01 1.07 
Demand 
Instability 535 8.55 0 8.55 0.38 0.97 
Government 
Stability  535 5.63 5 10.63 7.21 1.16 
Law & 
Order  535 4 2 6 4.68 1.06 
Bureaucracy 
Quality  535 3 1 4 3.43 0.79 
              
 
 Both demand instability and performance risk had a large range and low means.  
As a result, the data was reexamined and outliers were detected.  In order to address this 
issue, demand instability and performance risk were converted to dichotomous variables. 
Each variable was split into two groups using the median value.  For demand instability 
the median was .255 and for performance risk, the media was .134.  Those below the 
median were set equal to 0 and those above the median were set equal to 1.  The 
dichotomous variables were later tested in the model along with the original variables.  
There results for the models tested with  the dichotomous variables and the original 
variables were not different.  As a result, because demand instability and performance 
risk were left in their original form.  
Control Variables 
 Several variables are being controlled for in this study.  These include firm’s 
industry membership (Adams et al., 1998; Cowen et al., 1987; Hackston & Milne, 1996; 
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Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992), the number of countries in which 
the company operates (Ge & McVay, 2010) and the number of years a firm has reported 
using the GRI.  Descriptive statistics for each of these variables can be found in Table 15. 
In the data set, 72.4% of firms were considered to be high profile. 
Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Industry Profile 535 0 1   
Segments – Geo 535 0 30 5.01 4.364 
Years Reported 535 1 13 4.07 2.704 
      
 
Correlations between variables, which can be found in Table 16,  were reviewed 
for both dependent and independent variables. Bivariate correlations of .90 and higher 
suggest substantial collinearity, however, it may be present with correlations as low as 
.70 (Hair et al., 2010). Correlations between the independent variables were well below 
the .70 threshold with the exception of the correlation between the Law and Order Index 
and the Bureaucracy Quality Index which was .805.  Given this one exception and the 
low correlations between variables, collinearity was determined not to be an issue.  
Tolerance measures were used to further evaluate the relationship between the Law and 
Order Index and the Bureaucracy Quality Index and assess for multicollinearity.  The 
tolerance value was .213 and the corresponding VIF is 4.69.  This is above the common 
cutoff threshold of 1.0 for tolerance values of .10 and would not need to be addressed 
given the sample size in this study (Hair, et al., 2010). 
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Analytical Approach  
  The data that has been compiled for this research is complete with one exception.  
Corporate reputation scores are only available for 103 of the 535 companies included in 
this research.  This was identified early in the research as a possible issue because in 
studies used to evaluate reputation, a limited numbers of companies are typically 
assessed.  Some scholars have used the Reputation Institute’s RepTrak as a measure of 
corporate reputation in order to overcome to try and overcome this issue (Fombrun & 
Pan, 2006; Othman et al., 2011; Vidaver-Cohen 2007).  However, for this study, even the 
number of companies with publicly available RepTrak scores was limited.  
  Within the sample, corporate reputation was the only variable with incomplete 
data.  Given the circumstances and the amount of missing data, the variable was omitted 
from the initial analysis.  A second analysis was conducted of companies with a corporate 
reputation score in order to detect any marked differences (Hair, et al, 2010).  The results 
of that analysis will be reported later in this chapter.   
Logistic Regression Analysis  
 As in past CSR disclosure research, logistic regression is used to analyze the 
relationship between categorical dependent variables and metric and non-metric 
independent variables (e.g. Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang, 2011; Kolk & Perego, 2010; 
Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Perez-Batres, Miller & Pisani, 2010; Roberts, 1992).  This type of 
analysis requires a minimum of 10 observations per independent variable. It is also 
recommended that the total sample be greater than 400 (Hair et al., 2010; Hosmer & 
Lemeshow, 2000).  
 As a result of having two dependent variables, GRI application level and third 
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party assurance, two different logistic models were analyzed.  In the first model, the GRI 
application level was the dependent variable and third party assurance was the dependent 
variable for the second model.  The analysis included an overall evaluation, goodness-of-
fit-statistics and tests of individual predictors.   
 The overall evaluation of the GRI application level model based on the likelihood 
ratio test indicated that the final model is a better fit than the intercept-only or null model 
(X
2
=168.794, p = . 000).  An evaluation was also done for the third party assurance 
model and the likelihood ratio test of the model produced similar results.  It also 
demonstrated that the full model is a better fit than the intercept or null model 
(X2=130.458, p= .000).    
Goodness-of-Fit-Statistics.  
 In assessing the goodness of fit for each model, the Cox and Swain, Nagelkerke 
and McFadden tests were used to assess the proportion of explained variance (Hair, et al, 
2010).  The scores for each test can be found in Table 17. The primary value of this 
information is to compare competing models (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).  
Table 17 
Goodness of Fit Scores 
Application Level 
Model  Tool Score 
  Cox and Nell 0.271 
  Nagelkerke 0.309 
  McFadden 0.151 
Assurance Model Tool Score 
  Cox and Nell 0.216 
  Nagelkerke 0.289 
  McFadden 0.176 
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Tests of Hypotheses. As shown in Table 18, four of the 19 predictor variables were 
found to be statistically significant in the application level model.  The strongest predictor 
in the model, years reported (B= .368, p=. 000),  was one of the control variables,.  The 
other three variables which were found to be significant include (9a) the presence of a 
corporate foundation (B= -0.371, p= .046), (15a) government stability (B= -0.196, p= 
.015) and (17a) bureaucratic quality (B= -0.615, p= .003).  Despite these results,  none of 
the hypotheses which predicted the firm’s level of CSR disclosure were supported.  
While these relationships were predicted as positive, the direction of the relationship was 
incorrectly hypothesized and they were instead found to be negative.  
 For third party assurance, six of the 19 predictor variables were statistically 
significant.  As shown in Table 19, years reported was the strongest predictor (B= 0.218, 
p= .000) just as it had been in the application level model.  The second significant 
variable was bureaucratic quality, which was negatively related to third party assurance 
(B= -1.001, p=. 000).  The third significant variable was the government stability, which 
was negatively related to the firm deciding to pursue third party assurance (B= -0.286, 
p=. 002).  The fourth predictor, the Law and Order Index, was positively related to third 
party assurance (B= 0.469, p=. 007).  The fifth significant variable was the corporate 
governance ratio and it is positively related to third party assurance (B= 1.724 p= .009).  
The final significant variable was systemic risk-beta and it is positively related to third 
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Table 18 
Application Level Model Parameter Estimates 
 
    
Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
    
Threshold App Level = 1 -3.678 0.928 15.704 1 0.000 
  App Level = 2 -1.25 0.913 1.876 1 0.171 
Location Firm Size -7.16E-07 1.49E-06 0.231 1 0.631 
  Firm Age -0.001 0.002 0.503 1 0.478 
  Corp Governance -0.322 0.581 0.308 1 0.579 
  Lagged ROE -0.071 0.141 0.254 1 0.614 
  Beta -0.088 0.177 0.249 1 0.618 
  GDP -0.098 0.085 1.321 1 0.250 
  Performance Risk 0.135 0.228 0.351 1 0.554 
  Demand Instability 0.027 0.098 0.078 1 0.780 
  Government Stability -0.196 0.081 5.887 1 0.015 
  Law and Order 0.171 0.15 1.309 1 0.253 
  Bureaucracy Quality -0.615 0.208 8.742 1 0.003 
  Segments- Geo 0.007 0.022 0.096 1 0.757 
  Years Reported 0.368 0.042 77.875 1 0.000 
  Media 0.004 0.003 1.731 1 0.188 
  Stakeholders 0.035 0.039 0.816 1 0.366 
  Segments - Business -0.012 0.033 0.144 1 0.705 
  CSR Committee -0.196 0.189 1.077 1 0.299 
  Foundation -0.371 0.186 3.998 1 0.046 
  Industry -0.178 0.2 0.792 1 0.373 
 
 The only hypotheses that were supported in the study were for predictors of the 
firm’s choice of third party assurance. These include (5b) governance structure, (7b) 
systemic risk and (16b) the Law and Order Index. A positive relationship had also been 
hypothesized between government stability and the firm’s choice of third party assurance. 
However, it was predicted as positive, but was found instead to be negative.    
 One of the control variables was also found to be a significant predictor.  The 
number of years a company has reported was found to be a strong predictor of both GRI 
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application level (B= .368, p= .000) and third party assurance (B= .218, p= .000). This 
finding was expected based on comments from the executives interviewed earlier in this 
research.   
Table 19 
Assurance Model Parameter Estimates 
 
    
Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
    
Threshold Assurance = 0 -2.226 1.034 4.637 1 0.031 
Location Firm Size 1.30E-06 1.64E-06 0.622 1 0.430 
  Firm Age 0.002 0.002 1.032 1 0.310 
  Corp Governance 1.724 0.661 6.791 1 0.009 
  Lagged ROE 0.061 0.156 0.153 1 0.696 
  Beta -0.5 0.209 5.704 1 0.017 
  GDP -0.113 0.099 1.298 1 0.255 
  Performance Risk 0.221 0.248 0.791 1 0.374 
  Demand Instability 0.012 0.112 0.011 1 0.918 
  Government Stability -0.286 0.092 9.744 1 0.002 
  Law and Order 0.469 0.175 7.211 1 0.007 
  Bureaucracy Quality -1.001 0.241 17.231 1 0.000 
  Segment - Geo 0.049 0.025 3.822 1 0.051 
  Years Reported 0.218 0.042 26.858 1 0.000 
  Media 0.001 0.003 0.051 1 0.821 
  Stakeholder 0.038 0.044 0.73 1 0.393 
  Segments - Business 0.015 0.037 0.164 1 0.685 
  CSR Committee -0.192 0.215 0.8 1 0.371 
  Foundation 0.115 0.209 0.305 1 0.581 
  Industry -0.326 0.23 2.014 1 0.156 
 
Corporate reputation.  As noted earlier, corporate reputation and the associated 
set of hypotheses were omitted from the initial analysis.  A separate analysis was carried 
out of the 103 companies included that have corporate reputation scores available. In 
comparing the descriptive statistics of firms with corporate reputation scores with those 
of the broader sample, there are some noticeable differences. Firms with reputation scores 
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seem to be larger and older. As shown in Table 20, firms with corporate reputation scores 
had a mean of 95,520 employees and had been in business on average nearly 102 years. 
Firms without corporate reputation scores had a mean of 29,042 employees and had been 
in business on average 74.12 years. Firms with corporate reputation scores on average 
also had a higher lagged ROE (.2097 vs. .175).  In terms of environmental turbulence, 
firms with corporate reputation scores have lower performance risk (.272 vs. .408), lower 
demand instability (.238 vs. .412) and slightly higher government stability (7.32 vs. 




  N Range Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Firm Size 103 552373 52 552425 95520.0194 1.06E+05 
Firm Age 103 340 3 343 101.572 58.244 
CSR Committee 103 1 0 1   
Segments - Bus 103 21 1 22 4.805 3.084 
Corp Gov Ratio 103 0.68 0 0.68 0.181 0.1423 
Lagged ROE 103 2.74 -0.31 2.43 0.209 0.269 
Beta 103 2.8 -0.27 2.53 0.847 0.525 
Stakeholders 103 10 3 13 7.912 2.165 
Corp Foundation 103 1 0 1   
Media 103 442 0 442 51.417 77.554 
Corp Reputation 103 38.21 42.79 81 67.915 7.159 
GDP Growth 103 4.3 1.11 5.4 2.869 0.631 
Performance Risk 103 1.38 0 1.38 0.271 0.236 
Demand Instability 103 5.65 0 5.65 0.238 0.584 
Govt Stability 103 3.37 5.13 8.5 7.319 0.882 
L&O Index 103 4 2 6 4.909 0.806 
Bureaucracy Quality 103 2 2 4 3.801 0.535 
Industry Profile 103 1 0 1   
Segments-Geo 103 25 0 25 5.6311 4.010 
Years Reported 103 12 1 13 5.3786 2.918 
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For this model with the dependent variable of level, the likelihood ratio test of the 
final model indicated that the model is a better fit than the intercept-only or null model 
(X2= 64.108, p = .000).  For assurance in this model, the likelihood ratio test of the final 
model also indicated that the model was a better fit than the intercept or null model (X2= 
33.407, p= .030).  This is shown in Table 21. 
Table 21 
Goodness of Fit Scores 
 Application Model With 
Corporate Reputation Included  Tools Scores 
  Cox and Nell 0.463 
  Nagelkerke 0.544 
  McFadden 0.328 
      
Assurance  Model With 
Corporate Reputation Included Tools Scores 
  Cox and Nell 0.277 
  Nagelkerke 0.371 
  McFadden 0.236 
      
   
 When corporate reputation was added to the application level model, three of the 
twenty predictor variables were found to be statistically significant.  Years reported 
remained the strongest predictor in the model (B=.424, p= .000).  The corporate 
governance ratio (B=-4.386, p= .009) and corporate reputation (B=-.087, p= .034) were 
also found to be statistically significant.  However, both were negatively related to the 
firm’s application level and they had been predicted to be positively related.  Just as in 
the previously tested model, none of the hypotheses which predicted the firm’s level of 
CSR disclosure were supported.  
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 Interestingly enough, when corporate reputation was added to the model, 
bureaucratic quality and government stability ceased to be significant. This is curious 
because these items are not highly correlated with corporate reputation. An additional 
 analysis was undertaken to investigate the possibility that these may be predictors of 
corporate reputation and that corporate reputation serves as a mediator between these 
indices and the GRI application level. A separate multiple regression was run which 
resulted in an extremely low R2 and showed no statistically significant relationships.   
 When corporate reputation was added to the third party assurance model, only 
two of the twenty predictor variables were statistically significant.  Unlike in the 
application level model, Beta (B=-1.378, p= .016)  was the strongest predictor. Years 
reported was the only other variable that proved to be significant (B=.245, p= .020). In 
this model, corporate reputation (B=.034. p= .221)was not significant.  
Summary 
 This chapter has presented the results of five qualitative interviews that provide 
insights into the suitability of the proposed constructs and into each firm’s approach to 
reporting.  While the companies represented in the interviews chose a range of 
application levels, only one firm chose to pursue third party assurance.  The executives 
described the focus of their firm’s CSR reports but did not suggest anything that would 
raise concern about the suitability of the proposed constructs.  
 A quantitative analysis was undertaken to understand the determinants of a firm’s 
CSR disclosure strategy.  The evidence resulting from the present study indicates that 
only four of the 19 predictor variables were found to be statistically significant of the 
firm’s choice of GRI application level.  The strongest predictor in the model was years 
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reported (p= .000) followed by bureaucratic quality (p= .003), government stability (p= 
.015) and the presence of a corporate foundation (p= .046). For third party assurance, five 
of the 19 predictor variables were statistically significant. Years reported was the 
strongest predictor followed by bureaucratic quality (p= .000), government stability (p= 
.002), the Law and Order Index (p= .007), the corporate governance ratio (p= .009) and 
Beta (p= .024). 
   The evidence from this study indicated that none of the hypotheses that predicted 
the firm’s level of CSR disclosure was supported. There were relationships observed, 
however, between the presence of a corporate foundation (Hypothesis 9a), government 
stability (Hypothesis 15a) and bureaucracy quality (Hypothesis 17a) and the firm’s 
choice of application level. While these relationships were predicted as positive, they 
were instead found to be negative.  
 The only hypotheses in the study that were supported were predictors of the 
firm’s choice of third party assurance.  Governance structure (Hypothesis 5b), systemic 
risk (Hypothesis 7b), and the Law and Order Index (Hypothesis16b) were all supported.  
There was also a relationship between government stability and the firm’s choice of third 
party assurance. However, it was predicted as positive but was found instead to be 
negative.    
 In the next chapter, these findings are discussed in significant detail. Each of the 
constructs is examined through a theoretical lens and the results are explained. The 
study’s limitations are also elucidated and future areas of research are proposed. Finally, 
the implications of the study for both practitioners and scholars are discussed. 
  






 With the evolution of CSR reporting practices and the introduction and 
widespread adoption of the GRI Guidelines, this research sought to understand the factors 
that determine a company’s CSR disclosure strategy.  This research examined the 
relationship between a four-dimensional model of reporting determinants and a firm’s 
CSR disclosure strategy and found only one strongly predictive construct.  However, the 
combination of predictive variables that were shown to be related help strengthen 
understanding of disclosure strategy.  The findings of this research also suggest that 
theoretical models proposed by Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002) are no longer 
sufficient to explain the determinants of a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.   
 In an effort to explain a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy, researchers have used a 
broad theoretical framework.  This has happened because no single theory is able to 
effectively explain CSR reporting (Adams & Whelan, 2009; Cormier et al., 2005; Deegan 
& Blomquist, 2006; Gray et al., 1995).  Past research has focused on stakeholder, 
institutional and legitimacy theories and has suggested they have complementary effects.  
These theories have helped guide this research and the findings from this study help 
further reinforce the role that each theory plays in explaining the determinants of CSR 
disclosure.  The results also provide added insight into each of the theories despite the 
fact that the hypotheses that have been proposed here have gone largely unsupported.  
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The discussion that follows will explain how these outcomes further our understanding of 
theory and of the factors that determine the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.   
Non-Financial Corporate Characteristics 
 Institutional theory suggests that firms operate in environments shaped by shared 
rules, values and beliefs (Hoffman, 1999; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Nikolaeva & 
Bicho, 2011).  The resulting norms influence the strategic adoption and use of CSR 
reporting frameworks (Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Hoffman, 1999; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 
2011).  These norms often lead companies to exhibit mimetic behaviors and justify their 
decisions based on actions other companies have taken (Milne & Patten, 2002; Nikolaeva 
& Bicho, 2011).   
 In the past, both firm size and firm age were found to be positively related to the 
quantity and quality of CSR disclosures (Adams et al., 1998; Bayoud, Kavanagh & 
Slaughter, 2012; Cowen et al., 1987; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Hackston & Milne, 1996; 
Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992).  This would suggest that firms mimicked those with similar 
characteristics.  The lack of support shown for firm size and firm age in this study, and 
the strong support shown for years reported, suggests that firms have changed the criteria 
that guide their mimetic behavior.  In determining who to benchmark against, firms are 
likely to mimic other companies based on their reporting experience.   
 Results from both the executive interviews and the quantitative study also support 
the role of reporting experience when determining how much to report.  These findings 
suggest that as firms gain experience, their choices of application level and third party 
assurance become institutionalized within the firm.  The executive interviews performed 
in this study involved a group of companies with considerable experience in CSR 
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reporting who consistently applied their disclosure strategy.  The most experienced of 
these companies issued their first CSR report in 1999 and most of the others started 
reporting sometime between 2001 and 2004.  Their choice of application level and third 
party assurance has remained consistent over the last two years.  One executive that was 
interviewed said his firm had no plans to change its reporting because it had become so 
adept at carrying out the strategy.   
 The quantitative study produced similar results.  On average, companies in the 
data set had used the GRI framework for 4 years and over 80% of the firms reported at a 
B level or higher.  Slightly more than half the firms employed third party assurance.  The 
reporting experience and level of reporting seem to suggest that for many firms 
institutional norms that guide CSR reporting are likely already in place.   
 This study also examined the role of the company’s Board of Directors.  Previous 
studies showed that the quantity and quality of CSR reporting was influenced by the 
presence of a board level CSR committee and the firm’s governance structure.  They also 
suggested that CSR practices are more likely to be adopted when they are recognized as 
institutionalized norms (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010).  For many companies, a board 
level committee was needed to help the company establish institutionalized norms and 
make CSR disclosure a common practice.   
 The role of the Board of Directors, as institutional and stakeholder theories would 
support, was to help establish institutional norms for reporting and to represent the 
perspective of key stakeholders.  Give the theory and results from past research, it was 
hypothesized that the presence of a board level CSR committee would be positively 
related to the firm’s choice of application level and third party assurance. A similar 
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hypothesis was proposed for the firm’s governance structure.  The lack of support shown 
for both hypotheses suggest a changing role for the firm’s Board of Directors.  
 As a result of the firm’s reporting experience and the Board’s influence, 
institutional norms that govern the firm’s reporting are now in place.  These factors seem 
to have changed the role of the Board of Directors in determining CSR disclosure 
strategy.  During the executive interviews, the Board’s role was described as merely 
advisory.  The evidence would suggest that more focus is being placed on senior leaders.  
These results would suggest that as firms gain experience in reporting and norms are 
established, the role of the Board is less central to the firm’s disclosure strategy.  It seems 
that as the focus shifts to implementation, senior leaders take on an increasing role and 
serve to reinforce the norms that have already been established.   
 Business complexity was the last of the non-financial characteristics to be 
examined.  Consistent with past studies, business complexity was measured by both the 
number of operating segments and geographic segments within a firm (Boesso & Kumar, 
2007; Dilling, 2010; Ge & McVay, 2010).  It was believed that these measures reflect the 
increased risk of interacting with multiple stakeholders and the need to interact with 
multiple countries to fulfill the firm’s social contract.  The number of operating segments 
was not related to either the firm’s choice of application level or third party assurance.  
The results that have been reported thus far suggest that while firms with a large number 
of operating segments may face increased risk from interacting with multiple 
stakeholders, their level of reporting has been maintained over time.  The executive 
interviews also suggest that because firms are comfortable with the reporting process, 
they are less likely to be impacted by the number of operating segments.   
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 The number of geographic segments did appear to be related to both the firm’s 
choice of application level and third party assurance.  However, it lacked statistical 
significance.  The interviews also suggested that the number of geographic segments 
influence the firm’s disclosure strategy.  As the numbers of geographic segments grow, 
so does the amount of overall information that must be collected to satisfy stakeholders 
and fulfill the firm’s social contract.  In one of the interviewed firms, responses to more 
than 4000 questions had to be collected from multiple geographic units.  This clearly 
showed that a large increase in the amount of information collected could adversely 
affect the firm’s choice of reporting level due to staffing requirements.   
Financial Performance 
 The inclusion of firm financial performance as a construct was predicated on the 
belief that economic performance would impact the firm’s ability to invest in CSR and its 
associated disclosure.  For this study, both lagged return on equity and systemic risk, 
were evaluated and neither were related to the firm’s choice of application level.  These 
results are best explained by the firm’s reporting experience and the observation that for 
many firms, reporting practices have become institutionalized within the firm.  Reporting 
experience has allowed firms to adjust to adverse financial performance and systemic 
risk.  As a result, firms have remained consistent in their reporting.  A few of the firms in 
the executive interviews mentioned resource availability as a potential issue.  The impact 
of this, however, was described only as an issue for firms contemplating future changes 
to their reporting levels.  
 Systemic risk, the other measure of financial performance, was not found to be 
related to the firm’s choice of application level.  When considering past results and the 
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results from this study, it would seem that as firms gain reporting experience, they 
become accustomed to systemic risk.  As reporting practices have become more 
institutionalized within the firm, systemic risk no longer seems to influence a company’s 
disclosure strategy.  
 In contrast, systemic risk was found to be related to the firm’s decision to pursue 
third party assurance.  Legitimacy theory suggests that as a firm encounters risks, it must 
be ready to engage in a legitimization process (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Islam & Deegan, 
2010).  The results from this study demonstrated that as systemic risk increases, firms 
pursue third party assurance to address the volatility and maintain legitimacy.  One 
company that was included in the executive interviews employed third party assurance 
because it wanted to be perceived as transparent.  This may be especially important to 
institutional investors who already pay close attention to financial measures.  This would 
suggest that in addressing systemic risk, it is more important for the firm to have 
someone affirm what has been reported rather than to report at the highest level possible.   
 The executive interviews provided additional insights into the lack of adoption of 
third party assurance.  Costs were often cited as the reason four of the five firms chose 
not to employ third party assurance.  Because the cost of third party assurance would 
equal that of creating the report, the costs were viewed as excessive.  The process was 
also considered redundant because much of the data in the report had already been 
assured for inclusion in other reports.  
Stakeholder Involvement 
 The results observed with the stakeholder involvement construct could best be 
explained by stakeholder theory.  As the global marketplace grows more complex, firms 
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find themselves interacting with a broad range stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 
1984; Hult, Mena, Ferrell & Ferrell 2011).  Stakeholder theory suggests that in the course 
of operating, firms interact with multiple stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; 
Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Hult et al., 2011) and that the expectations of stakeholders are the 
primary motivation for CSR reporting (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Mitchell et al., 
1997).  This creates more risk and because there is often incongruity among stakeholders, 
the firm focuses on those who are believed to have the greatest priority (Freeman, 1984; 
Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Hult et al., 2011; Jones, 1995; Mitchell, Agle & 
Wood, 1997).   
 The number of stakeholders was examined as a predictor of the firm’s disclosure 
strategy because it was thought that this measure reflects the increased risk a firm faces 
as stakeholder interactions increase.  In the executive interviews, the role of the 
stakeholder was a central focus.  Each of the executives described a group of stakeholders 
with whom the firm interacts and suggested that alignment with these stakeholders is 
crucial.  Executives focused specifically on alignment with government, shareholders, 
non-governmental organizations and customers/consumers.  Despite the qualitative 
findings, the number of stakeholders was not supported as a predictor of the firm’s GRI 
application level or its choice of third party assurance.   
 These findings would seem to suggest that the added risk of interacting with a 
number of stakeholders is likely less important in determining the firm’s disclosure 
strategy than the type of stakeholder with whom the firm interacts.  This would also be 
consistent with the concept of stakeholder salience, which suggests that firms prioritize 
stakeholders because they lack the resources to treat them all equally.  Prioritization is 
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based on the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm, the legitimacy of the their 
relationship with the firm and the urgency of their claim (Freeman, 1984; Fiss & Zajac, 
2006; Frooman, 1999; Hult et al., 2011; Jones, 1995; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997).  
The results seen with political turbulence, which will be discussed later, also reinforce the 
role of stakeholder salience.  Those results clearly show that government is accorded a 
high priority and thus affects the firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  
The relationship between corporate sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation and 
the firm’s level of social disclosure was also examined.  Previous research showed this 
variable to be positive and highly significant (Roberts, 1992).  However, this study, found 
a negative relationship between corporate sponsorship of a philanthropic foundation and 
the GRI application level a firm chooses to declare.  One possible explanation for the 
negative relationship with GRI application levels is that the firm has been able to 
establish legitimacy through the recognition it receives as the sponsor of a corporate 
foundation.  As a result, a lower application level may be deemed sufficient.   
The lack of relationship between corporate foundation sponsorship and third party 
assurance would also be explained by legitimacy theory.  The theory would suggest that 
the firm’s sponsorship of the foundation might have been the result of a separate attempt 
to secure legitimacy.  The absence of a relationship may indicate that because legitimacy 
has been established, the firm does not choose to engage in an additional legitimization 
process.   
Media exposure has been previously examined as a measure of society’s interest 
in a company’s CSR activities. However, it was not supported as a predictor for either the 
firm’s application level or its choice of third party assurance (Aerts, Cormier & Magnan, 
	   110	  
2006; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Cormier, Magnan & Van 
Velthoven, 2005; Kennedy, 2008; Neu et al., 1998, Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012).  There 
was also no mention of media by any of the executives that were interviewed.  These 
results are best interpreted using legitimacy theory which suggests that firms want to be 
seen as legitimate by society and as a result go through a legitimization process (Ashforth 
& Gibbs, 1990; Islam & Deegan, 2010).  The findings here suggest that legitimacy may 
have already been achieved and is not under threat.  As a result, media exposure is not 
required to substantiate the GRI application level chosen by the firm.  The results would 
also suggest that a firm’s state of legitimacy has negated the need to pursue third party 
assurance.  
Another potential explanation for these results is that the volume of media 
exposures does not reflect stakeholder salience.  CSR reporting has been viewed as a 
means by which to share CSR activities and results with stakeholders.  This measure does 
not reflect the prioritization of a specific stakeholder or a set of stakeholders.  The 
findings here suggest that broad media exposures have no influence either on the level of 
reporting or the need for third party assurance.  
  The final measure of stakeholder involvement, corporate reputation, was 
described in executive interviews as an important factor in influencing the firm’s choice 
of disclosure strategy.  The results of the secondary analysis, which included corporate 
reputation, suggested that it was negatively related to the GRI application level.  While 
the sample from this study was too small, the relationship here could best be explained by 
legitimacy theory.  Low corporate reputation rankings may signal to the firm that 
legitimization is required.  As a result, firms with lower reputation scores report at higher 
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levels to signal legitimacy.  Conversely, for firms with higher reputation scores, a high 
application level is not needed to signal legitimacy.   
While a relationship was observed between corporate reputation and the firm’s 
reporting level, it was not related to the firm’s choice of third party assurance.  As noted 
earlier, companies often mimic the behaviors of firms they hold up as role models and are 
more likely to justify their decisions based on the actions those companies have taken 
(Milne & Patten, 2002; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  The findings here would seem to 
suggest that the firm’s choice to pursue third party assurance may be driven more by 
firms they emulate than by their own corporate reputation. 
Environmental Turbulence  
 Interviews with executives seemed to shed little light on economic turbulence.  
While the availability of resources within the firm was mentioned, there were no 
references made to either the general economy or to factors affecting the industry of 
which they are a part.  Economic turbulence, like firm financial performance, was 
thought to impact the firm’s ability to invest in CSR and its associated disclosure.  In this 
study, none of the measures of economic turbulence - GDP growth, performance risk and 
demand instability - were related to either the firm’s choice of GRI application level or 
the firm’s choice of third party assurance.   
 The CSR reports, which were the focus of this study, were compiled in 2011 
during the global recession.  The reporting experience of the firms, which was discussed 
relative to financial performance, has seemingly led to the establishment of 
institutionalized reporting norms.  Evidence of these norms is found in both the executive 
interviews and data from the quantitative study.  These norms lead firms to maintain their 
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level of reporting despite adverse economic conditions.  The lack of relationship between 
GDP and the firm’s application level and its choice of third party assurance also suggests 
that CSR strategies are stable.  This means that CSR reporting can be a valuable tool for 
companies to express concern for society and demonstrate legitimacy regardless of 
economic conditions (Othman, Darus & Arshad, 2011).    
 The results of this study also found that industry focused measures of economic 
turbulence were not related to either firm’s choice of application level or its choice of 
third party assurance.  The results for both performance risk and demand instability 
suggest that firms are not affected by industry volatility.  Past research also has shown 
that certain industries have more intense competition, receive more scrutiny from 
regulators and/or be more visible by stakeholders.  Being part of these higher profile 
industries has been shown by earlier researchers to impact the firm’s disclosure strategy. 
These results show, however, that firms are not affected by industry membership.  Taken 
together, these results once again suggest companies’ CSR disclosure strategies are 
driven by institutional norms.  As was shown before, these results also seem to suggest 
that firms compare themselves to firms outside of their industry when assessing their 
CSR disclosure.  
 Unlike economic turbulence, measures of political turbulence were found to be 
strong predictors of both the firm’s application level and its choice of third party 
assurance.  This can be attributed to the firm’s desire to be seen as legitimate.  The need 
for legitimacy increases during political turbulence and the results from this study support 
that notion.  Localized external pressure and disruptive events like political turbulence 
are believed to be threats to the firm’s legitimacy (Hoffman, 1999).  These factors can 
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create institutional pressure to adapt policies and practices.  As a result, norms and 
expectations may change over time and create incongruity between a firm’s values and 
those of society.  
  In order to maintain legitimacy, the firm must monitor the environment and be 
ready to engage in a legitimization process (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Islam & Deegan, 
2010).  Past research has shown national institutions to be a strong predictor of firm level 
CSR practices.  Empirical evidence has also suggested that the institutional environment 
plays a pivotal role in influencing companies reporting practices (O’Dwyer, 2003).  Not 
only have institutional pressures been shown to be strong determinants of CSR 
disclosures, they have also been able to play a role in firms’ adoption of the GRI 
standards.  In the executive interviews, one company described its disclosure strategy as 
being actively prepared for issues that can be predicted and to respond reactively on a 
case-by-case basis for those that cannot be predicted.   
 The Government Stability Index measured government unity, legislative strength 
and popular support (ICRG, 2012).  The Law and Order Index assessed the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, as well as observance of the law (ICRG, 2012).  Finally, 
the Bureaucracy Quality Index measures the expertise, quality and stability of elected 
officials and their administrative counterparts.  The results from the quantitative study 
indicate that as the quality and stability of elected officials drops, there is an increasing 
need to be seen as legitimate.  This is important because reporting at a higher level may 
help reduce future calls for mandatory reporting and for increased government regulation. 
Higher reporting levels could also be interpreted by government as a signal from the firm 
that it is being more transparent.   
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 Government stability and bureaucratic quality were found to be strong predictors 
of both the firm’s chosen application level and third party assurance.  These findings are 
consistent with past research which showed that firms that are more attuned to the 
environment are more sensitive to institutional pressures and are more likely to respond 
through increased disclosure (Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).  The disclosures also provide a 
means by which to signal stakeholders that companies have sound CSR activities.  They 
also provide a valuable tool for companies to express concern for society and 
demonstrate legitimacy (Othman, Darus & Arshad, 2011).   
   These findings are important for two reasons.  First of all, these findings suggest 
as government stability and bureaucratic quality decrease, the firm chooses higher 
application levels. It also chooses to have its reports assured by a third party.  This could 
further indicate that firms may view government as having greater salience than other 
stakeholders.   
 The findings also reinforce the role of legitimacy theory, which suggests that for 
the firm to maintain legitimacy; it must be cognizant of changes to the environment and 
be ready to engage in a legitimization process (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Islam & Deegan, 
2010).  Disclosing CSR-related activities and engaging in the assurance process serves to 
signal legitimacy, which may be helpful where government stability and bureaucratic 
quality are low (Bebbington, Larrinaga-Gonzalez & Moneva-Abadıa, 2008; Fombrun & 
Gardberg, 2000; Gray et al., 1995).  
 The final measure used to assess political turbulence was only found to have a 
relationship with a firm’s choice of third party assurance.  These results are not 
unexpected considering that Law and Order Index is used to assess the observance of the 
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law.  This can also be best explained using legitimacy theory.  By operating within 
society’s norms and expectations and providing third party assurance, the firm receives 
support for its operations in an environment, which values adherence to the law (Guthrie 
& Parker, 1989; O’Dwyer, 2003; Suchman, 1995).   
Limitations  
 The executive interviews served to help confirm the model and inform data 
interpretation.  However, due to language limitations, the firms that were included in this 
study were restricted to those whose executives spoke English.  This led to a sample of 
companies based either in the United States or Western Europe.  Firms in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America were not included.  As a result, key insights from these regions were 
not included.    
 Another limitation of the executive interviews was that open-ended questions that 
were included were overly broad.  The questions were helpful in identifying holes in the 
model, but were too broad to sufficiently delve into the constructs or into each of the 
individual variables.  More specific questions are needed to provide deeper insight into 
the firm’s strategy and its process for reporting.  
Finally, the questions that were included provided more insight into the choice of 
application level than into the firm’s decision to pursue 3rd party assurance.  Respondents 
were asked what influenced their current application level choice, but they were not 
asked what influenced their use of the GRI framework.  They were not asked about what 
influences their decision to pursue 3rd party assurance.  While many of the respondents 
shared that information, the interviews could have provided greater insight about the 
choice of third party assurance.  
The sample used in the quantitative portion of the study also had limitations. With 
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the inclusion of certain financial measures, only public companies were included in the 
study.  While the data set that resulted was substantial, it was too small to be able to 
analyze both an analysis sample and a holdout sample.  Splitting the sample into these 
smaller samples would have reduced the sample size further and reduced the power of the 
model (Hair, et al., 2010).  
 As a result of the focus on public companies, private firms, cooperatives, non-
profit organizations, partnerships, state owned companies and subsidiaries that are 
included in the registry were not included in the sample.  While these organizations 
would not have been able to be included in the present model given the included 
measures, further evaluation and a refined model may help provide additional insight 
about CSR disclosure strategies.   
There were also limitations associated with specific variables.  The most notable 
of these is corporate reputation.  While difficulty with past corporate reputation measures 
was noted prior to the start of the study, the number of companies with RepTrak scores 
was so limited that it was difficult to draw conclusions from this variable.  Additionally, 
measures of stakeholder involvement do not adequately capture the power, legitimacy or 
urgency of individual stakeholders.  
Future Research 
The findings from this study reinforce the need for additional study of CSR 
disclosure strategy.  As has ben noted throughout the discussion presented here, a number 
of questions persist that require examination.  These questions will result in areas of 
additional research that should be undertaken.  
One area that must be more closely examined in future research is the role of 
specific stakeholders.  The executive interviews shed light on the influence of certain 
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stakeholders.  Additional research is needed to understand if the inclusion of specific 
stakeholder groups in the CSR report influences either the choice of application level or 
the decision to pursue third party assurance.  In addition to data that can be gleaned from 
a quantitative study, numerous questions remain about stakeholders that require 
additional qualitative interviews.  For instance, what criteria does the firm use to rank 
order its stakeholders?  Once the firm has prioritized its stakeholders, do the goals for 
reporting differ by stakeholder and if so, how might they differ?  These questions can 
help shed light on the role of stakeholder salience in determining a firm’s CSR disclosure 
strategy. 
The results suggested that for firms with reporting experience, firm size and firm 
age are no longer criteria that are used to determine potential comparators.   Given this 
change, it is important to understand the criteria firms now use.  It would be useful to 
examine companies that have changed their reporting levels during the last two years to 
determine if there is a difference between those firms and firms who have maintained 
their reporting level.  A similar examination should be undertaken of those who have 
applied third party assurance in the last two years versus those that have remained 
consistent.  Finally, it would be useful to examine firms that have not chosen an 
application level to understand the role that firm size and firm age have as predictors 
compared to reporting experience.   
 Questions remain about institutional norms that guide companies in the 
construction of their CSR reports.  It is also not clear what these norms consist of and 
what role the firm’s values and corporate culture may play.  As the role of the Board of 
Directors shifts from strategic to advisory, it would be useful to understand how the role 
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of the Board and the role of senior staff differ.  It is also unclear what role individual 
business units might play in shaping the disclosure strategy.  
 There are also questions about institutional processes that companies follow to 
construct their CSR reports.  While executives described the role of committees within 
their firms, the size and makeup of those committees is still unclear.  It would be helpful 
to understand how many employees may be involved formally and informally and how 
their roles differ.  The role of third party advisors and consultants is also unclear.  Further 
research is needed to understand how these individuals may influence the structure of the 
report, the choice of application level and the role of third party assurance.  Greater 
clarity about their role in strategy and report development could also be beneficial.  These 
questions would require a mix of both qualitative and quantitative research.  
 One final area of future research that could be useful is to understand the role of 
other influencers.  A topic that was discussed during one of the executive interviews was 
the benchmarking of that firm against others who were thought to be leaders in CSR 
reporting.  It was not clear what criteria might be used by the firm or by other firms to 
determine comparators.  It is also unclear what role the UN Global Compact, Carbon 
Disclosure Project and other similar efforts may have on a firm’s reporting.   
Implications 
 This study has significant implications for firms that employ CSR disclosure 
strategies and for the researchers who study them.  The factors that once influenced CSR 
disclosure strategies have changed with the evolution of CSR reporting practices and the 
introduction and widespread adoption of the GRI Guidelines.  This research sought to 
understand if theoretical models proposed by Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002) were 
still sufficient to explain the determinants of a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.    
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Ultimately, it sought to understand if non-financial corporate characteristics, financial 
performance, stakeholder involvement and environmental turbulence were predictive of 
the firm’s choice of GRI application level and whether or not it should pursue third party 
assurance.   
 While only one of the four constructs was supported, the combination of 
predictive variables that were shown to be related help strengthen our understanding of 
disclosure strategy.  For practitioners, there are four key concepts that firms must 
consider in developing their CSR disclosure strategy.  These include stakeholder salience, 
environmental turbulence, mimetic behavior, and institutional norms.  
 Stakeholder salience suggests that certain stakeholders are prioritized by the firm 
because of their power, their legitimacy and the urgency of their issue (Mitchell, et. al, 
1997).  Practitioners must pay close attention to these criteria as they determine which 
stakeholders should the focus of the firm’s CSR disclosures.  Of the stakeholders in this 
study, government was most powerful not just because of its interactions with the firm, 
but also because of its ability to create a turbulent business environment.   
 Practitioners must monitor the impact of government at all levels and understand 
the threat environmental turbulence may play in undermining the firm’s legitimacy. 
Decreases in government stability and bureaucratic quality have created political 
turbulence that has led firms to choose higher application levels and third party 
assurance.  In this turbulent environment, practitioners must also be prepared to modify 
the reporting strategy their firm employs for CSR reporting in order to meet society’s 
expectations and the expectations of key stakeholders (Ader, 1995, Neu et al., 1998; 
Yongvanich & Guthrie, 2006).  
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  In developing disclosure strategies, practitioners must also be aware of criteria 
that guide their choice of comparator firms and the mimetic behaviors that result.  Firms 
have based their disclosure strategy on those firms with reporting experience rather than 
those who are the largest or oldest.  While they have mimicked the reporting practices of 
other companies, the influence of those firms may not fully be appreciated.  Given this 
research, practitioners should proactively consider how they choose comparator firms. 
Understanding these factors will help guide future CSR disclosure strategies.  It is also 
important that they recognize that the practices firms adopt will ultimately become 
institutional norms that shape the firm’s reporting.  Those charged with developing the 
firm’s disclosure strategy should be aware of how institutional norms, values and beliefs 
shape the business environment in which the firm operates and its strategy for reporting 
(Hoffman, 1999; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).   
 For scholars, the results of this study help strengthen the understanding of theories 
used to explain a firm’s CSR disclosure strategy.  Ultimately, the findings suggest that 
theoretical models proposed by Ullmann (1985) and Adams (2002) are no longer 
sufficient to explain the factors that influence a firm’s strategy for CSR reporting.  Past 
efforts to explain the quantity and quality of CSR reporting have relied on a broad set of 
theories.  Institutional, stakeholder and legitimacy theories all have a role in explaining 
the determinants of a firm’s disclosure strategy and must work in concert with one 
another if disclosure strategies are to be explained sufficiently.    
 This study reinforced that no single theory is sufficient to explain CSR reporting. 
Instead, future studies must employ a broad theoretical framework similar to that which 
has been used here.  In applying this theoretical framework, researchers like practitioners 
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must pay attention to certain key concepts.  Based on this research, future studies of CSR 
disclosure strategy must pay attention to stakeholder salience, environmental turbulence, 
the firm’s mimetic behavior and the institutional norms it adopts.    
 Stakeholder salience suggests that certain stakeholders are prioritized by the firm 
because of their power, their legitimacy and the urgency of their issue (Mitchell, et. al, 
1997).  Research should examine a set of stakeholders that is determined based on 
stakeholder salience.  Based on this research, specific stakeholders like employees, 
customers, shareholders, government and non-governmental organizations must be 
included.  Others may be examined, but only if they are deemed to have salience and be 
central to understanding CSR disclosures.  
 In this study, government was found to be the most powerful stakeholder. 
Government stability and bureaucratic quality have shaped the business environment and 
led firms to choose higher application levels and third party assurance.  This has created a 
need to better understand environmental turbulence and the role of the business 
environment in shaping firms’ disclosure strategies.  The firm’s pursuit of legitimacy 
means it must also monitor the environment and be ready to engage in a legitimization 
process.  In the future, conceptual models used to explain CSR disclosure strategies 
should include both specific stakeholders and environmental turbulence.     
 Finally, mimetic behaviors and institutional norms are also concepts that shape 
the firms reporting strategy.  This research suggests that firms are now likely to mimic 
other companies CSR reporting efforts based on their reporting experience.  Scholars 
must better understand the criteria that guide the choice of comparator firms.  It is also 
crucial to understand the comparison process and how mimetic behaviors develop.  
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 As has been noted, firms mimic the reporting practices of other companies, but 
may not fully appreciate the influence those firms may have.  Given the role that these 
firms have, scholars must better understand the process of comparison and how this helps 
inform CSR disclosure strategies.  As firms gain experience, their choices of application 
level and third party assurance are institutionalized within the firm.  It is important first to 
understand how the practices a firm adopts guides its reporting.  It is also important to 
understand how the firm’s experience influences institutional norms that ultimately guide 
its disclosure strategy.  Given what has been learned here, both mimetic behaviors and 
institutional norms must be included in future models.  
 As shown here, this study has significant implications for both practitioners and 
scholars in furthering our understanding of CSR disclosure strategies.  Widespread 
adoption of the GRI Guidelines and firms’ experience with this framework has influenced 
CSR disclosure strategies that firms employ.  As use of the GRI continues to grow, 
practitioners must consider how stakeholder salience, environmental turbulence, mimetic 
behavior and institutional norms shape their strategies.  At the same time, researchers 
must continue to understand how these and other factors that have not been studied here 
may be predictive of the firm’s choice of GRI application level and whether or not it 
should pursue third party assurance. 
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   GRI Performance Indicators (GRI, 2012, 26-39) 
Economic Performance Indicators 
Aspect: Economic Performance 
EC1 (Core) Direct economic value generated and distributed, including 
revenues, operating costs, employee compensation, donations and other 
community investments, retained earnings and payments to capital 
providers and governments. 
EC2 (Core) Financial implications and other risks and opportunities for 
the organization’s activities due to climate change. 
EC3 (Core) Coverage of the organization’s defined benefit plan 
obligations. 
EC4 (Core) Significant financial assistance received from government. 
Aspect: Market Presence 
EC5  (Additional) Range of ratios of standard entry level wage by gender 
compared to local minimum wage at significant locations of operation.  
EC6 (Core) Policy, practices and proportion of spending on locally-based 
suppliers at significant locations of operation.  
EC7  (Core) Procedures for local hiring and proportion of senior 
management hired from the local community at locations of significant 
operation.  
Aspect: Indirect Economic Impacts 
EC8  (Core) Development and impact of infrastructure investments and 
services provided primarily for public benefit through commercial, in- 
kind or pro bono engagement.  
EC9  (Additional) Understanding and describing significant indirect 
economic impacts, including the extent of impacts.  
Environmental Performance Indicators 
Aspect: Materials 
EN1  (Core) Materials used by weight or volume.  
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EN2  (Core) Percentage of materials used that are recycled input 
materials.  
Aspect: Energy 
EN3  (Core) Direct energy consumption by primary energy source.  
EN4  (Core) Indirect energy consumption by primary source.  
EN5  (Additional) Energy saved due to conservation and efficiency 
improvements.  
EN6  (Additional) Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable 
energy based products and services and reductions in energy requirements 
as a result of these initiatives.  
EN7  (Additional) Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and 
reductions achieved.  
Aspect: Water 
EN8  (Core) Total water withdrawal by source.  
EN9  (Additional) Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of 
water.  
EN10  (Additional) Percentage and total volume of water recycled and 
reused.  
Aspect: Biodiversity 
EN11 (Core) Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in or 
adjacent to, protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside 
protected areas.  
EN12  (Core) Description of significant impacts of activities, products 
and services on biodiversity in protected areas and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected areas.  
EN13  (Additional) Habitats protected or restored.  
EN14 (Additional) Strategies, current actions and future plans for 
managing impacts on biodiversity. 
EN15 (Additional) Number of IUCN Red List species and national 
conservation list species with habitats in areas affected by operations, by 
level of extinction risk. 
 
	   143	  
Aspect: Emissions, Effluents And Waste 
EN16 (Core) Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by 
weight. 
EN17 (Core) Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight. 
EN18 (Additional) Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
reductions achieved. 
EN19 (Core) Emissions of ozone-depleting substances by weight. 
EN20 (Core) NO, SO and other significant air emissions by type and 
weight. 
EN21 (Core) Total water discharge by quality and destination. 
EN22 (Core) Total weight of waste by type and disposal method. 
EN23 (Core) Total number and volume of significant spills. 
EN24 (Additional) Weight of transported, imported, exported or treated 
waste deemed hazardous under the terms of the Basel Convention Annex 
I, II, III and VIII and percentage of transported waste shipped 
internationally. 
EN25 (Additional) Identity, size, protected status and biodiversity value 
of water bodies and related habitats significantly affected by the reporting 
organization’s discharges of water and runoff. 
 Aspect: Products And Services 
EN26  (Core) Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products 
and services and extent of impact mitigation.  
EN27  (Core) Percentage of products sold and their packaging materials 
that are reclaimed by category.  
 Aspect: Compliance 
EN28 (Core) Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-
monetary sanctions for non-compliance with environmental laws and 
regulations. 
Aspect: Transport 
EN29 (Additional) Significant environmental impacts of transporting 
products and other goods and materials used for the organization’s 
operations and transporting members of the workforce. 
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Aspect: Overall 
EN30 (Additional) Total environmental protection expenditures and 
investments by type. 
Social Performance Indicators 
Labor Practices/Work Performance Indicators 
 Aspect: Employment 
LA1  (Core) Total workforce by employment type, employment contract 
and region, broken down by gender.  
LA2  (Core) Total number and rate of new employee hires and employee 
turnover by age group, gender and region.  
LA3  (Additional) Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not 
provided to temporary or part- time employees, by significant locations of 
operation.  
LA15 (Core) Return to work and retention rates after parental leave, by 
gender. 
Aspect: Labor/Management Relations 
LA4  (Core)Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements.  
LA5  (Core) Minimum notice period(s) regarding operational changes, 
including whether it is specified in collective agreements.  
Aspect: Occupational Health And Safety 
LA6  (Additional) Percentage of total workforce represented in formal 
joint management–worker health and safety committees that help monitor 
and advise on occupational health and safety programs.  
LA7  (Core) Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days and 
absenteeism and total number of work-related fatalities, by region and by 
gender.  
LA8  (Core) Education, training, counseling, prevention and risk-control 
programs in place to assist workforce members, their families or 
community members regarding serious diseases.  
LA9  (Additional) Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements 
with trade unions.  
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Aspect: Training And Education 
LA10 (Core) Average hours of training per year per employee by gender 
and by employee category. 
 
LA11  (Additional) Programs for skills management and lifelong learning 
that support the continued employability of employees and assist them in 
managing career endings.  
LA12  (Additional) Percentage of employees receiving regular 
performance and career development reviews, by gender.  
Aspect: Diversity And Equal Opportunity 
LA13 (Core) Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of 
employees per employee category according to gender, age group, 
minority group membership and other indicators of diversity. 
Aspect: Equal Remuneration For Women And Men 
LA14 (Core) Ratio of basic salary and remuneration of women to men by 
employee category, by significant locations of operation 
Human Rights Performance Indicators 
 Aspect: Investment And Procurement Practices 
HR1 (Core)  Percentage and total number of significant investment 
agreements and contracts that include clauses incorporating human rights 
concerns or that have undergone human rights screening. 
HR2 (Core) Percentage of significant suppliers, contractors and other 
business partners that have undergone human rights screening and actions 
taken. 
HR3 (Core) Total hours of employee training on policies and procedures 
concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations, 
including the percentage of employees trained. 
Aspect: Non-Discrimination 
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Aspect: Freedom Of Association And Collective Bargaining 
HR5 (Core) Operations and significant suppliers identified in which the 
right to exercise freedom of association and collective bargaining may be 
violated or at significant risk and actions taken to support these rights. 
Aspect: Child Labor 
HR6 (Core) Operations and significant suppliers identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of child labor and measures taken to 
contribute to the effective abolition of child labor. 
Aspect: Forced And Compulsory Labor 
HR7 (Core) Operations and significant suppliers identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of forced or compulsory labor and measures 
to contribute to the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor. 
Aspect: Security Practices 
HR8 (Additional) Percentage of security personnel trained in the 
organization’s policies or procedures concerning aspects of human rights 
that are relevant to operations. 
Aspect: Indigenous Rights 
HR9 (Additional) Total number of incidents of violations involving rights 
of indigenous people and actions taken. 
Aspect: Assessment 
HR10 (Core) Percentage and total number of operations that have been 
subject to human rights reviews and/or impact assessments. 
Aspect: Remediation 
HR11 (Core) Number of grievances related to human rights filed, 
addressed and resolved through formal grievance mechanisms. 
Society Performance Indicators 
 Aspect: Local Communities 
 SO1 (Core) Percentage of operations with implemented local community 
 engagement, impact assessments and development programs. 
 SO9  (Core) Operations with significant potential or actual negative 
 impacts on local communities.  
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 SO10  (Core) Prevention and mitigation measures implemented in 
 operations with significant potential or actual negative impacts on local 
 communities.  
Aspect: Corruption 
SO2  (Core) Percentage and total number of business units analyzed for 
risks related to corruption.  
SO3  (Core) Percentage of employees trained in organization’s anti-
corruption policies and procedures.  
SO4  (Core) Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption.  
Aspect: Public Policy 
SO5  (Core) Public policy positions and participation in public policy 
development and lobbying.  
SO6  (Additional) Total value of financial and in-kind contributions to 
political parties, politicians and related institutions by country.  
Aspect: Anti-Competitive Behavior 
SO7 (Additional) Total number of legal actions for anti- competitive 
behavior, anti-trust and monopoly practices and their outcomes. 
Aspect: Compliance 
SO8 (Core) Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-
monetary sanctions for non- compliance with laws and regulations. 
Product Responsibility Performance Indicators 
Aspect: Customer Health And Safety 
PR1 (Core) Life cycle stages in which health and safety impacts of 
products and services are assessed for improvement and percentage of 
significant products and services categories subject to such procedures. 
PR2 (Additional) Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning health and safety impacts of 
products and services during their life cycle, by type of outcomes. 
Aspect: Product And Service Labeling 
PR3  (Core) Type of product and service information required by 
procedures and percentage of significant products and services subject to 
such information requirements.  
	   148	  
            PR4  (Additional) Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning product and service 
information and labeling, by type of outcomes.  
            PR5  (Additional) Practices related to customer satisfaction, including 
results of surveys measuring customer satisfaction.  
 Aspect: Marketing Communications 
PR6  (Core) Programs for adherence to laws, standards and voluntary 
codes related to marketing communications, including advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship.  
PR7  (Additional) Total number of incidents of non-compliance with 
regulations and voluntary codes concerning marketing communications, 
including advertising, promotion and sponsorship by type of outcomes.  
 Aspect: Customer Privacy 
PR8 (Additional) Total number of substantiated complaints regarding 
breaches of customer privacy and losses of customer data. 
Aspect: Compliance 
PR9 (Core) Monetary value of significant fines for non- compliance with 









1. Please describe your role in determining your company’s strategy for disclosing 
CSR activities. 
2. Describe the manner in which your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR 
activities is determined. 
3. How long has your company disclosed its CSR activities? 
4. How long have you used the GRI Guidelines to guide your CSR reporting? 
5. Does your company choose to declare an application level? 
6. If so, what GRI application level does your firm currently declare?  
7. Has the GRI application level that your company declares changed during the last 
two years? If so, please describe the change. 
8. What factors influenced your company’s current choice of GRI application level? 
9. Does your company currently employ third party assurance? 
10. Has this changed during the last two years? If so, please describe the change. 
  





Interview Transcript - Company A 
 Company A, listed on the New York Stock Exchange, is a multi-national 
automaker with its headquarters in the United States.  The company sells automobiles and 
commercial vehicles under separate brands and in the past, it has also produced heavy 
trucks, tractors and automotive components.  Today, the company employs more than 
160,000 employees worldwide (Capital IQ, 2013).  
 This company was included in the executive interviews because of its long-
standing commitment to corporate social responsibility reporting.  Company was one of 
the first to focus on the environmental impact of its activities and have used this to 
distinguish them from other automakers.  The company was also an early adopter of the 
GRI and has disclosed its activities using the reporting framework since 2000. (GRI, 
2012) 
1.) Please describe your role in determining your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR 
activities.  
 The formal title of the executive who was interviewed is reporting manager.   
Within the corporate structure, his department is referred to as Sustainability and Safety.    
His specific role is to manage both the process of reporting and the structure of the 
reporting efforts.  Those who preceded him established the scope of his role. Today, he is 
responsible for the firm’s mandatory 10K’s and its sustainability report.    
 Company A has produced 14 sustainability reports and it has used the GRI since 
the third or fourth report.  During the interview, the executive described the firm’s 
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sustainability journey, which has shaped the sustainability report and other types of 
communications.  The journey has been about more than just the horsepower of its 
products.  It is characterized by a change in the company’s perspective of the world and 
its role in it.  The journey has a definitive starting point and some easy to see milestones.  
Because it is a continuous process, the journey does not have a definitive end.   
 The company recognizes it needs to be a responsible steward of its resources.  It 
sees the business impact of climate change.  The company also recognizes that it was part 
of the problem and now seeks to be part of the solution.  Today, it is focused on the 
benefits of smart water and power use.  The company has also looked at how to harness 
its philanthropic support.  As an example, the company’s employees are using technology 
from city centers to help ensure pregnant women in Chennai get the healthcare they need.   
This demonstrates how the company is thinking about things that it did not think about 
before. 
2.) Describe the manner in which your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR activities 
is determined. 
 The executive who was interviewed decides the application level for the 
company’s report.  The decision is somewhat dependent on guidance from the GRI.  In 
the past, there have been arguments about what constitutes materiality.  It is beyond 
GRI’s mandate to have companies prove why something is not material.  The company 
has previously reported at an application level as high as A+.  
 He suggested that the number of issues that are reported on is not really an 
indicator of the report’s quality.  The GRI helps provide a wonderful framework to help 
guide reporting and helps make reports easier for stakeholders to read.  If everyone 
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examined the GRI reports and the framework, then those that would report would be 
forced to be more consistent.    
 The company’s annual objective is to report at an application level A with self-
assessment.   Third party assurance is not a focus because it is tantamount to an audit.  It 
would cost at least as much to assure the report as it does to create it.  Additionally, third 
party assurance would be redundant because much of the data in the report contains 
information that has to be reported to government agencies and has already been assured.  
3.) How long has your company disclosed its CSR activities?  
 The CSR report that Company A issued in June will be the firm’s fourteenth.  Its 
first report was issued in 1999. 
4.) How long have you used the GRI Guidelines to guide your CSR reporting?  
 The company has used the GRI standard since 2000 and it became an 
organizational stakeholder in 2003. 
5.) Does your company choose to declare an application level? Yes. 
6.) If so, what GRI application level does your firm currently declare?  
 The firm declares an application level A. 
7.) Has the GRI application level that your company declares changed during the last two 
years? If so, please describe the change.  
 The company’s GRI application level has not changed.  It last changed 4 years 
ago in 2009.  
8.) What factors influenced your company’s current choice of GRI application level?  
 Pride is one of the primary factors.  GRI is the best standard and the others 
compete rather than cooperate.  The GRI is also part of the company’s sustainability 
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journey.  CSR disclosures have become a good habit and the company likes the 
reputational benefits that come with the good habit.  The company is benchmarked by 
other companies who are just beginning the sustainability journey.    
 The primary audience for the CSR report is the company’s employees.  Corporate 
leadership wants to help employees be educated ambassadors for the company.  Investors 
are also an important audience, but not the primary audience. 
9.) Does your company currently employ third party assurance?   
 The firm does not employ third party assurance. 
10.) Has this changed during the last two years?  If so, please describe the change.   
 The company’s use of third party assurance has not changed in the last two years. 
Interview Transcript - Company B 
 Company B, listed on the New York Stock Exchange, is a multi-national 
pharmaceutical company with its headquarters in the United States.  It ranks amongst the 
top 15 globally based on its market capitalization (Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology News, 2013).  The company discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells 
pharmaceutical products for both human and animal health.  Today, the company 
employs approximately 38,000 employees across the globe (Capital IQ, 2013). 
 This company was included in the executive interviews because of its intermittent 
approach to disclosing its CSR activities.  While Company B is well known for its 
philanthropic activities, the company has exhibited an inconsistent approach to reporting.   
As an example, the company first reported their CSR activities in 2003, but has often 
skipped several years between reports.  Prior to the firm’s 2011 report, the company’s last 
disclosure took place in 2007 (GRI, 2012). 
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1.) Please describe your role in determining your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR 
activities.  
 The executive works with key external advisors outside of Company B to   
understand what other companies are doing and this helps influence Company B’s choice.   
After the pros and cons are weighed, recommendations are made about the most 
appropriate application level.  Third party assurance has not been an option due to cost.  
2.) Describe the manner in which your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR activities 
is determined.  
 Company B’s reporting is driven by two major factors.  The first is the 
willingness of key corporate functions to disclose information.  Some areas are not 
willing at all. The second factor is the adequacy of staff and resources. 
3.) How long has your company disclosed its CSR activities?  
 The company started disclosing its CSR activities in 2003 but it has not reported 
continuously.  It has reported on an annual basis since signing onto UN Global Compact.   
Annual reports meet the criteria set out by both GRI and UN Global Compact.  Every 
other year it does a full report.  
4.) How long have you used the GRI Guidelines to guide your CSR reporting?  2011 
5.) Does your company choose to declare an application level?  Yes. 
6.) If so, what GRI application level does your firm currently declare?   
 The firm declares an application level B. 
7.) Has the GRI application level that your company declares changed during the last two 
years?   
 The company’s GRI application level has not changed. 
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8.) What factors influenced your company’s current choice of GRI application level?  
 The factors that influenced Company B’s current choice of GRI application level 
are the cost of reporting and concerns over reporting data that could prove to be a 
competitive disadvantage. 
9.) Does your company currently employ third party assurance?   
 The firm does not employ third party assurance. 
10.) Has this changed during the last two years?  If so, please describe the change.   
 The company’s use of third party assurance has not changed in the last two years. 
Interview Transcript - Company C 
 Company C, listed on the Swiss stock exchange, is a multi-national human 
resource staffing firm with its headquarters in Switzerland.  The company offers firm 
provides staffing, placement, career and outsourcing services as well as consulting with 
firms about its human resources needs.  The company employees 33,000 employees in 
over 60 countries around the world (Capital IQ, 2013). 
 This company was included in the executive interviews because it is focused on 
services rather than tangible products.  Company C did not begin to use the GRI reporting 
framework to disclose its activities until 2008.  Since that report was issued, the company 
has consistently used the GRI framework (GRI, 2012). 
1.) Please describe your role in determining your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR 
activities.  
 The executive is part of a CSR Disclosure Steering Committee that determines the 
focus of the report and the key performance indicators.  
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2.) Describe the manner in which your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR activities 
is determined.  
 Company C relies on small group of countries to be part of a CSR Disclosure 
Steering Committee.  The CSR report is focused on 6 areas and the committee has 
developed key performance indicators for each.  For the first time, the board of directors 
reviewed and approved the company’s CSR report. 
 The company’s approach to reporting has not always been strategic.  In the past, 
the information that each country would contribute to the report lacked uniformity.  This 
year the approach was more strategic.  Representatives from each country were given a 
questionnaire and asked to collect the required data from different parts of the 
organization.  The amount of information needed was large with 4,000 questions 
requiring answers and it has plans to be more strategic in its future reporting. 
3.) How long has your company disclosed its CSR activities?  
 Company C first disclosed its CSR activities in 2004. 
4.) How long have you used the GRI Guidelines to guide your CSR reporting? 
 Company C has used the GRI Guidelines to guide its CSR reporting since 2008 
although it did produce CSR Reports from 2004-2007. 
5.) Does your company choose to declare an application level?  Yes. 
6.) If so, what GRI application level does your firm currently declare? 
 The firm declares an application level B.   
7.) Has the GRI application level that your company declares changed during the last two 
years? 
 The application level that the company declares has not changed during the last 
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two years.  
8.) What factors influenced your company’s current choice of GRI application level? 
 The maturity of CSR within the company has been the primary factor that has 
influenced the company’s current application level. 
9.) Does your company currently employ third party assurance?   
 The firm does not employ third party assurance. 
10.) Has this changed during the last two years?  If so, please describe the change.   
 The company’s use of third party assurance has not changed in the last two years. 
Interview Transcript - Company D 
 Company D, listed on the DAX, is a multi-national company with its headquarters 
in Germany.  The company develops, produces, and markets health care and agriculture 
products, and high-tech materials worldwide.  Today, the company employs 
approximately 113,000 employees across the globe (Capital IQ, 2013). 
 This company was included in the executive interviews because of its broad 
business mix and its long-standing approach to CSR reporting.  Company D has 
consistently used the GRI framework to guide its reporting and has reported at the highest 
possible level.  The firm has reported at an A+ level since 2008 (GRI, 2012). 
1.) Please describe your role in determining your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR 
activities. 
Company D looks at CSR more holistically and as such refers to its efforts as 
sustainability rather than merely CSR.  There are people throughout the organization who 
are responsible for sustainability and this includes a member of the board of directors as 
well as representatives from each division -material science, healthcare and crop science.   
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There is a clear commitment to follow with up on sustainability activities throughout the 
company.   
Decisions about the firm’s sustainability strategy are made by a sustainability 
committee.  Three to four times per year representatives from the business units sit 
together to talk about activities and strategies.  On an annual basis, it discloses activities in 
the report.  From next year onward, it will be incorporated into the annual report.  It will 
play an important role in that report.  It is important that it be integrated part of its 
reporting.  
2.) Describe the manner in which your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR activities 
is determined.  
 Each division is asked to develop an individual strategy.  Under this motto, it is 
the company’s aim to help provide broad access to innovative products in healthcare with 
a focus on less well-resourced countries.  The commercial focuses on how in the country 
availability will be provided.  For instance, it has put a program in place for family 
planning methods focused on women and girls where it is working with international 
partners like the United Nations Population Fund.  It is also focusing on tropical and 
neglected diseases and looking at how can it broaden its product portfolio to focus on 
these under-served areas.   
 From innovation to areas of pure CSR, each division takes responsibility for its 
planning.  In order to avoid overlap, the sustainability committee discusses these plans 
and the headquarters function is also included. 
3.) How long has your company disclosed its CSR activities?   
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 It has disclosed its CSR activities since 2001 in a stand-alone report.  Next year’s 
report will be included as part of the Annual Report rather than as a stand-alone.   
4.) How long have you used the GRI Guidelines to guide your CSR reporting?  
  It has orientated its report on the GRI guidelines since 2001 and reported 
according to GRI Guidelines since 2005.   
5.) Does your company choose to declare an application level?  Yes 
6.) If so, what GRI application level does your firm currently declare?  
 It declared an A+, which has been the declared level since 2008. 
7.) Has the GRI application level that your company declares changed during the last 
two years?  
 The application level that the company declares has not changed during the last 
two years.   
8.) What factors influenced your company’s current choice of GRI application level? 
 Company D wants to be perceived as a company that is transparent.  The latest 
report will includes key performance indicators and it reports what it plans to achieve and 
what it has achieved.  It provides information on all issues which the company and its 
stakeholders consider to be relevant for sustainability. 
9.) Does your company currently employ third party assurance?   
 The firm does not employ third party assurance. 
10.) Has this changed during the last two years?  
 The company’s use of third party assurance has not changed in the last two years.  
Price Waterhouse Coopers has reviewed all content included in Company D’s 
sustainability report.  The reason for integrating the sustainability report into the annual 
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report is the growing relevance of non-financial key performance indicators for the 
evaluation and assessment of companies. It is also a general trend. 
Interview Transcript - Company E 
 Company E, listed on the NYSE, is a multi-national company with its 
headquarters in the United States.  The company develops, produces, and markets 
consumer packaged goods through its three business units.  One of the business units is 
focused on the national market for consumer products while another is focused 
internationally.  The remaining business unit is focused on specialty products.  Today, the 
company and its subsidiaries employ approximately 4,300 employees across the globe 
(Capital IQ, 2013). 
 This company was included in the executive interviews because of its consumer 
focus and its limited experience with CSR reporting.  Company E has only reported since 
2007 and only employed the GRI framework in its 2011 report (GRI, 2012). 
1.) Please describe your role in determining your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR 
activities. 
 The executive who was interviewed is responsible for monitoring indictors and 
key forces within the industry.  Additionally, topics of interest to customers, 
shareholders, NGO’s and government are also monitored.  The composite findings are 
then shared with the Executive-VP level staff that is responsible for research and 
development, human resources, operations, legal and marketing.  The findings are also 
shared with the CEO who writes introductory comments for the reports.  
2.) Describe the manner in which your company’s strategy for disclosing CSR activities is 
determined.  
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 The company does not seek to be a leader in CSR reporting.  Instead, the 
company’s strategy is to be actively prepared for issues that can be predicted.  For those 
that cannot be predicted, the company responds reactively on a case-by-case basis.  
  Executive-VP level staffs that are responsible for research and development, 
human resources, operations, legal and marketing are briefed about indictors and key 
industry issues.  They are also briefed on key topics of interest to customers, shareholders, 
non-governmental organizations and government.  The risk level associated with each of 
these is determined and this informs leadership’s final determination as to what will be 
reported.  
  If government proposes rules, information is shared with management and a plan 
of action is suggested.  If a non-governmental organization makes a request, the company 
weighs the public relations risks.   Shareholders also receive rapid attention.  For example, 
a financial firm in Canada asked the company in 2007 to issue a sustainability report.  
After quickly doing a gap analysis, the info was gathered and a report was started. 
  Of all its stakeholders, however, alignment with customers and consumers is 
considered most critical.  The company sells its retail products directly to customers like 
groceries and other retailers who then sell them to consumers.  It also sells large scale and 
bulk products to industrial customers.  Because customers are interested in green 
disclosures, the company has responded by posting the ingredients to its products.  
3.)  How long has your company disclosed its CSR activities?  
 The company first disclosed its CSR activities in 2007 when it issued its first 
report.  Prior to 2007, the firm shared information about CSR activities in both its 10K 
report and its annual report.  
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4.) How long have you used the GRI Guidelines to guide your CSR reporting?  
 The company has used the GRI standard since 2007.  
5.) Does your company choose to declare an application level?  Yes. 
6.) If so, what GRI application level does your firm currently declare?  
 The firm declares an application level C. 
7.) Has the GRI application level that your company declares changed during the last two 
years?   
 The firm’s application has not changed during the last two years.  The firm is 
adept at this reporting level.  
8.) What factors influenced your company’s current choice of GRI application level?  
 The company’s current choice of GRI application level is driven by the number of 
indicators on which it reports.  The company reports on those items required for the C 
level plus eight to nine additional items for a total of twenty.  While the number of items 
is equivalent to that required for a B level, the items on which it reports on are not the 
same as those required for the B.  
 The company’s CSR program is young. In determining its disclosure strategy, the 
type of company and its universe of stakeholders must be considered.  Those responsible 
for the strategy believe it is more important to be consistent in what the firm reports 
instead of reporting at the highest level over night. In the future, the firm may choose to 
elevate its application level to a level B.  
 Company E has a long heritage of environmental concern but has yet to sign on to 
either the UN Global Compact or the Carbon Disclosure Project.  Signing on to either of 
these would put too much pressure on the company to move faster in its reporting than it 
	   163	  
wants to go.  Signing on may also cause redundancy.  The company already reports green 
house gases and it wants to control its own programs rather than ceding control to 
someone else. 
9.) Does your company currently employ third party assurance?   
 The firm does not employ third party assurance. 
10.) Has this changed during the last two years?  If so, please describe the change.   
 The company’s use of third party assurance has not changed in the last two years.  
It does use 3rd party auditors for other programs.  Responsible Care is an audit of what the 
specialty products division goes through every year.  
 
 
 
 
